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Issues and Conclusions 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
For the past two decades, Turkey has been rediscover-
ing the Balkans. The end of the Cold War and the dis-
solution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the 
subsequent violence were decisive points in Turkish 
foreign policy. New openings toward southeast Europe 
and the creation of new states greatly transformed the 
foreign policy strategies of Turkey, which was aiming 
for far-reaching political impact. Joining multilateral 
forces, Turkey took an active role and put greater em-
phasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where Mus-
lims had suffered tragically during the Bosnian War 
(1992–1995). Later on, during the Kosovo War in 1999 
and throughout the long-standing dispute between 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece 
over the name ”Macedonia,” Turkey strived for a me-
diator’s role in the region. While experiencing strong 
economic growth in early 2000, and with the rise of 
the newly formed Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), the Balkans was at the center of Turkey’s atten-
tion. By abandoning traditional realpolitik and apply-
ing new approaches such as “zero problems with 
neighbors” and “win-win” policies under former Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s patronage, Turkey found 
itself particularly well placed to play a major role in 
the region. With fragments of the Ottoman legacy as 
well as cultural relations that existed in the region 
and the identification of “kin” communities, Turks 
abroad were seen as a genuine asset that would create 
a favorable milieu for renewed close relations with 
communities in the Balkans. 
Parallel to Turkey’s efforts to revive its Ottoman 
inheritance in the Balkans, the ongoing European 
Union (EU) accession process that all countries of the 
Western Balkans have subscribed to reveals substan-
tial slowdowns. A decade after the process began, and 
despite a remarkable list of activities, the Western Bal-
kans remains far from the explicit goals of the process 
– namely EU membership. After the initial post-con-
flict fragility that prompted the EU to move ahead 
with the EU accession process of the Western Balkans, 
the low levels of enthusiasm for the enlargement in 
European capitals – coupled with the global economic 
crisis – sharply diverted the EU’s attention from the 
Balkans, thereby creating a power vacuum. Using 
new policy twists – and with the absence of any solid 
results on the EU’s Western Balkans project – Turkey 
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steadily expanded its efforts to establish concrete 
structures throughout the region. Networks of Turkish 
religious and cultural institutions have found fertile 
ground in many parts of the Western Balkans. Schools 
and universities sprouted up, reviving demographic 
and cultural linkages. The Hizmet movement – an 
Islamic religious and social movement led by Turkish 
preacher Fethullah Gülen and his advocates – has 
flourished in the Balkans for years and has created 
its own network of NGOs, religious centers, schools, 
and colleges. Based on an approach that was leaning 
toward attraction and persuasion rather than pres-
sure, Ankara’s increased presence in the region in 
the last 20 years has provided enormous visibility. 
However, it has not been short on controversies.  
The influence and impact of Turkey and its motives 
in the Western Balkans divides opinions in this region 
as perhaps no other country. There are glaring differ-
ences in opinions about Turkey’s role, depending on 
who the observers are and, more importantly, which 
ethnicity they belong to. Although it has been con-
tested from the outset by vocal opponents of neo-
Ottomanism – mainly Christians – Turkey is simul-
taneously being worshiped by a majority of Muslims, 
who regard the Ottoman times as having been a 
golden age. By nurturing special relations in the pre-
dominantly Muslim areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and Sandžak, Turkey has 
hindered its influence with the non-Muslim commu-
nities there. Describing itself as a “protector” of Mus-
lims that is ready to fulfill a leadership role and place 
Ottoman values at the heart of its political influence, 
Turkey has not been able to convince the public of the 
Western Balkan of its universal approach to the region 
nor its impartiality. Moreover, Turkey’s careless public 
diplomacy rhetoric has often deepened longstanding 
divisions among different ethnic groups there. 
The long promised economic prospects that Turkey 
pledged to the region have also not materialized. 
Despite the astounding economic growth that initially 
facilitated a greater commitment to the region and 
its deeper immersion into social structures, Turkey is 
still not among the topmost economic partners in the 
region. With the departure of Prime Minister Davu-
toğlu in 2016 – the architect of Turkey’s foreign policy 
in the Balkans – as well as the ongoing domestic crises 
after the July 2016 military coup attempt, a new course 
in Turkish foreign policy for the region remains to be 
seen. The fact that Turkey has increasingly slid into 
more authoritarian rule and now features non-demo-
cratic tendencies – such as the absence of the rule of 
law, brutal confrontations with opponents of the 
establishment, and its growing alienation from the 
European Union – erodes its prospects of becoming 
a democratic future role model. Nevertheless, the 
danger is that the Western Balkans’ political elites, 
who themselves embrace non-democratic practices, 
may find Turkey’s way of governance as being just 
as apt. If more authoritarianism is reinforced in the 
Western Balkans, fragile democracies in the region 
might suffer irreversible damage. 
How has Turkey’s activism in the Western Balkans 
evolved since the end of the Cold War? Is Turkey a 
relevant factor in the region? And how will Turkey’s 
policies play out in different countries and different 
contexts? This study provides insights into Turkey’s 
policies in the Western Balkans region over the past 
two decades. Given the current status of the Western 
Balkan states, this paper advocates for more European 
coherence in the region, assuming that the recogni-
tion and trust that the EU has enjoyed in the region 
as a whole is still there. Issues relating to the econo-
mies, employment, and also democracy must be at the 
heart of the EU’s dialogue with the Western Balkans. 
Decreasing support for the EU project in the Western 
Balkans may lead to a strengthening of Ankara in the 
region, thereby potentially undermining EU efforts. 
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Turkey’s Comeback in the Balkans 
 
Much of the Balkans was under Ottoman rule, which 
lasted from the 14th century up until the early 20th 
century in some territories. Hundreds of thousands 
of Turks had settled in the Balkans in smaller cities, 
serving as garrison troops, civil servants, but they 
also found success as craftsmen and merchants. In the 
mid-20th century, only a small number of them still 
remained in Yugoslavia, mainly in Macedonia and 
Kosovo. With their exodus, everyday human contact 
with Turks vanished to a great extent – economic and 
cultural contacts were diminished and a general 
mutual separation set in.1 
The length of this rule and the strength of Turkey’s 
links differ throughout the Western Balkans, with the 
strongest connections being in the areas populated 
by Muslims. After the Ottomans lost control of the Bal-
kans, large numbers of ethnic Turks and other Mus-
lims migrated. Due to the arrival of so many people 
of Balkan origin, the Turks have viewed the Balkans 
as being somewhat part of Turkey’s hinterland. Today, 
many Balkan immigrants and their descendants live 
in Turkey. One source puts the number of immigrants 
moving from the Balkans to Turkey between 1923 and 
1995 at 1,643,058, a number that constitutes mostly 
inward immigration in those years.2 During the 
period between the establishment of the modern 
Republic of Turkey in 1922 and the year 1980, 
relations between the Balkans and Turkey were mostly 
formal and within the constraints of traditional high-
level diplomacy, outside the scope of either religion or 
culture. Immigrants from the Balkans assimilated into 
the majority culture over time, leaving some groups, 
such as Bosniaks, to sustain themselves in parts of 
Turkey (Istanbul, Pendik); however, this was not a 
typical pattern for other Bosniak communities in 
 
1  Marija Mitrovic Bošković, Dušan Reljić, and Alida Vračić, 
“Elsewhere in the Neighborhood: Reaching Out to the West-
ern Balkans”, in Turkey’s Public Diplomacy ed. B. Senem Çevik 
and Philip Seib (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
99–120 (103). 
2  Esra Bulut, “‘Friends, Balkans, Statesmen Lend Us Your Ears’: 
The Trans-state and State in Links between Turkey and the 
Balkans”, Ethnopolitics 5, no. 3 (30 November 2006): 309–26. 
Turkey.3 In fact, the entire Balkan region was a rather 
distant territory for Turkey, and its policies were 
restricted almost exclusively to security matters. In 
1953, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia signed in Ankara 
an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, later 
called the Balkan Pact. The treaty was perceived to be a 
fence against Soviet pressures in southeast Europe. 
From the mid-1950s onward, formal relations started 
realigning as Yugoslavia began developing policy that 
was increasingly non-aligned with Soviet policy, 
whereas Turkey entered the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 
The turning point for Turkey in the Western Bal-
kans was the region’s political (dis)order in the late 
1980s. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and new 
political dynamics in Eastern Europe created pressures 
for a more multi-directional Turkish foreign policy. 
International dynamics forced Turkey to reshape its 
priorities, thereby opening new geopolitical directions 
– and the Balkans were at the center of it. Moreover, 
the opportunity to overcome old animosities in its 
immediate neighborhood was not to be missed.4 
As the Cold War came to an end, relations started 
changing profoundly due to the new settings and Tur-
key’s new position within the international communi-
ty. In the first half of the 1990s, Turkey had already 
begun to restructure its foreign policy from being “the 
tail end of Europe into the center of its own newly 
emerging world.”5 At first supportive of Yugoslavia’s 
integrity, Turkey embarked on new strategies once it be-
came clear that Yugoslavia could not be kept together.6 
Turkey’s influence in the region emerged more pro-
foundly after the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
 
3  Keith Doubt, Through the Window: Kinship and Elopement in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina (Budapest and New York : CEU Press, 2014), 90, 
http://bit.ly/2aP27Ec (accessed 22 August 2015). 
4  What Does Turkey Think?, ed. Dimitar Bechev (London: Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations, June 2011), http://www. 
ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR35_TURKEY_AW.pdf (accessed 12 August 
2016). 
5  The European Geopolitical Forum (EGF), Transition, Security 
and Stability in the Wider-Black Sea Region. Transition in Turkey: A 
Critical Assessment and Current Challenges (Brussels, 2013), 5. 
6  Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkey and the Balkans: Overcoming 
Prejudices, Building Bridges and Constructing a Common 
Future”, Perceptions 18, no. 2 (2013): 163–84 (174). 
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Instability coming from the Balkans in the 1990s – 
especially in Bosnia – was closely followed in Turkey. 
In 1993, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense issued 
a White Paper that referred to ethnic conflicts, insta-
bility, and uncertainty in the regional context.7 Three 
years later, the 1996 White Paper drew attention to 
regional problems again – this time with a special em-
phasis on Bosnia. Shortly thereafter, media reports 
revealed clandestine military support to the Muslim 
faction in Bosnia. Supplying arms to Bosnia under the 
embargo8 were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Tur-
key.9 Turkey had also been involved in secret arms 
activities in 1992, when Iran had opened a smuggling 
route to Bosnia – a pipeline existed through which 
arms from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Pakis-
tan were transferred.10 Turkey was mentioned in 
relevant conversations as a direct supplier of arms, 
and in 1994 the US Central Intelligence Agency re-
ported that its satellites had taken photos of the same 
Iranian aircrafts on Turkish airfields – at the Zagreb 
International Airport and in other airports in Croatia 
– showing the arms being unloaded. This new activity 
did not go unnoticed. 
In 1992, Time magazine published a piece “the sick 
man recovers,” in which the following was stated: 
“No sooner has Germany begun to stretch its muscles 
across Central Europe than another historical ghost 
is emerging to the south. Turkey not only boasts a vig-
orous growing rate; it is now actively intervening in 
the economies of its sickly neighbors.”11 At the outset, 
external interest was declared to be of a humanitarian 
– and in the case of Bosnia, protective – nature. Yet, 
unavoidably, external involvement soon shifted to the 
influence struggle in the countries of the former Yugo-
 
7  Didem Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Diplomatic/Political, Economic and Military Relations (Ankara: 
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, 
Ph.D. dissertation, April 2009), http://bit.ly/2aDO4yy; Ministry 
of National Defense, The White Paper 96 (Ankara, 1996), 5–6 and 
15–16. Three years later, the 1996 White Paper drew atten-
tion to regional problems again – this time with special 
emphasis on Bosnia. 
8  On 25 September 1991, the United Nations Security Coun-
cil passed Resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on all 
of the former Yugoslav territories. 
9  Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era (see 
note 7). It was reported that the transfers, which arrived from 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, were diplomatic post. Other 
consignments were from Belgium, Hungary, Uganda, and 
Argentina. 
10  Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era 
(see note 7). 
11  “The Sick Man Recovers”, The Times, 28 January 1992. 
slavia and, thus, in southeast Europe as well. After the 
year 2000, violent conflicts mostly subsided, and com-
petition for influence in southeast Europe switched to 
public diplomacy and “soft power.”12 
The Kosovo War in 1999 and Priština’s subsequent 
quest for independence – as well as the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM’s) prolonged 
conflict with Greece over the “name issue”13 – were 
opportunities for Turkey to extend its influence in the 
Western Balkans. To do so, much had to be learned. 
Decades-long divisions had taken their toll, and in 
reality little knowledge existed in Turkey about the 
Balkans. “In 1992 or 1993, the daily newspapers Sabah 
started the promotion of newly independent states 
and gave flags of newly formed Turkic states in the 
newspapers. Promotion was attached to presenting 
new flags mostly of Central Asian new states, like 
Azerbaijan, but they included a Bosnian flag too, 
implying Bosnia is ethnically a Turkish state.”14 
During the initial period of the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, Turkey changed its previously passive 
approach and engaged with traditional foreign policy 
instruments, primarily multilateral ones. Holding 
some reservations on the actual impact within the 
EU and United Nations (UN) frameworks, Turkey still 
decided to actively work within this framework.15 
With an actual rise in interest in the Balkans after the 
AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey began developing 
new instruments of foreign policy and alternative 
channels for diplomatic gains. Following this course, 
Turkey launched different Balkan initiatives for par-
ticipation in newly established structures.16 The mas-
termind behind Turkey’s new foreign policy was Prof. 
Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. His famous book, Strategic Depth: Turkey’s Inter-
national Position, provided the basis for defining the 
 
12  Bošković, Reljić, and Vračić, Elsewhere in the Neighborhood 
(see note 1). 
13  Athens accuses Skopje of territorial ambitions by calling 
the state “Macedonia” because geographically Macedonia 
encompasses also northern Greece and Western Bulgaria. 
14  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance: Relations between 
Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2014), 20. 
15  Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth] 
(Ankara, 2001), 321. Davutoğlu perceived the EU and the UN 
frameworks as platforms that would limit Turkey’s influence 
in solving conflicts in the region and emphasised the need 
to associate problems with NATO that Turkey is its member. 
16  South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC), and South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). 
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principles and objectives of Turkey’s new foreign 
policy, and ultimately shaped Turkey’s approach to 
the Western Balkans.17 According to Davutoğlu, Tur-
key’s focus was anchored in Turkey’s Ottoman pres-
ence and power in the region at all times.18 Davutoğlu 
took geography as being the first determinant of for-
eign policy, and history as the second, particularly 
stressing the significant number of Turks with Balkan 
origins and people from Balkan countries living in 
Turkey.19 Turkey’s Balkan policy was regarded as a 
natural expression of existing geographical, historical, 
and cultural links, from the viewpoint of Davutoğlu.20 
In the early stages of involvement, economic aspects 
did not appear to be a central concern of Davutoğlu’s 
foreign policy approach. Priority has been given to the 
Ottoman heritage and engaging with Muslim kin com-
munities.21 
One problem with this was Turkey’s miscalcula-
tion of the region, its history, and its inhabitants. The 
majority of Serbs and Croats – both Christians – as 
well as influential parts of the Albanian intelligentsia 
deem the Ottoman rule as a period of enslavement 
and a tragedy that lasted for more than four centu-
ries.22 Albanians were not allowed to use their own 
language, and Ottoman policy allowed Albanian Mus-
lims only to attend Turkish schools.23 Even though 
they were free to practice their religion, they were 
degraded as citizens and had their property taken 
away. There were a range of rules and discriminatory 
 
17  Marija Mitrovic, Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans, 
GeT MA Working Paper Series, no. 10/2014 (Berlin: Depart-
ment of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 
2014), 24. 
18  Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (see note 15), cited in Sait 
Akşit, An Alternative or Embedded in the Mainstream: Political 
Economy of Turkey’s Involvement in the Balkans, http://bit.ly/ 
2av3J3K (accessed 11 November 2015). 
19  Sylvie Gangloff, The Impact of the Ottoman Legacy on Turkish 
Policy in the Balkans (1991–1999) (Paris: Centre d’études et de 
recherches internationales, November 2005), 1–20. According 
to the 1981 census in the former Yugoslavia, there were 
101,328 Turks comprising 0.5 per cent of the population. 
20  Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe 
and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000), 147. 
21  “The transformations in Turkish foreign policy in recent 
years facilitated its quest to have richer relations with the citi-
zens and kin communities abroad” (Kemal Yurtnaç, Turkey’s 
New Horizon: Turks Abroad and Related Communities, SAM Papers 
3/2012 [Ankara: SAM, Centre for Strategic Research, October 
2012], 3). 
22  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). 
23  Piro Misha, “Invention of a Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia”, 
in Albanian Identities: Myth and History, ed. Stephanie Schwandner-
Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (London: Hurst, 2002), 33–48 (38). 
regulations (kanuni rayi) against the non-Muslim popu-
lation in BiH during the Ottoman rule, for example: 
a prohibition to ride horses, carry weapons, wear 
clothes similar to the clothes of Muslims; Christians 
could also not testify in court, neither could they sue 
their Muslim neighbors.24 
Following the “kin”25 community’s ideology, and 
using the common platform of the EU accession pro-
cess that both Turkey and the Western Balkans ob-
tained in 2003, Turkey involved itself far more actively 
in the Balkans. As Davutoğlu himself stated, Turkey 
started to employ a European-style European Neigh-
borhood Policy26 and tried to achieve maximum co-
operation with all regional countries.27 Turkey’s for-
eign policy was pro-active and based on new principles 
such as “zero problems with neighbors” and “win-win” 
policies.28 In 2010, even the European Commission 
noted Turkey’s activism in the Balkans in its Progress 
Report, stating: “Turkey has taken a number of initia-
tives in the Western Balkans, expressing commitment 
to promoting peace and stability in the region. Turkey 
supports integration of all countries in the region both 
with the EU and at the Euro-Atlantic level.”29 
 
24  Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London, 1996), 66. 
25  Hugh Poulton, “Turkey as Kin-State: Turkish Foreign 
Policy towards Turkish and Muslim Communities in the Bal-
kans”, in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, ed. Hugh Poulton 
and Suha Taji-Farouki (London: Hurst, 1997), 194–213 (194). 
There are many definitions of “kin” in Turkish. The neo-Otto-
man community argument also links Turkey’s involvement 
in the region to strong domestic concern over residual Turk-
ish communities in the Balkans as well as to those of ethnic 
kin, for example Albanians, in Turkey. Turkey is, in other 
words, a kin state for certain communities in the Balkans. 
26  The policy was initiated by the EU to improve its relations 
with the countries in the neighbouring regions that do not have 
any chance of being full members in the foreseeable future. 
For a comprehensive evaluation of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy, see Bezen Balamir-Coşkun and Birgül Demirtaş-
Coşkun, Neighborhood Challenge: The European Union and Its Neigh-
bors (Boca Raton: Universal Publishers, 2009). Also see Sevilay 
Kahraman, “Turkey and the European Union in the Middle 
East: Reconciling or Competing with Each Other?”, Turkish 
Studies 12, no. 4 (2011): 699–716 (708); Senem Aydın Düzgit 
and Nathalie Tocci, Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest 
for Regional Leadership and Europeanisation (Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies [CEPS], 12 November 2009). 
27  Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Bal-
kans: A Europeanized Foreign Policy in a De-europeanized 
National Context?”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, 
no. 2 (2015): 123–40. 
28  Kemal Kirişci, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times (Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2006). 
29  European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, 
COM(2010) 660, http://bit.ly/1W5hxSJ (accessed 10 May 2016). 
Turkey’s Comeback in the Balkans 
SWP Berlin 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
December 2016 
 
 
 
10 
For the AKP, resolving disputes with neighbors 
was perceived as being vital. That, in return, required 
having more solid leverage that Turkey had to come 
up with, namely, entering the next stage of activism 
and introducing the promotion of trade and invest-
ment.30 Apart from becoming a member of the regional 
initiatives, Turkey’s position as a strategic country 
was enhanced by establishing trilateral consultation 
mechanisms – Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia, 
and Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia – and as-
suming a key role as a mediator in the region.31 Initial-
ly envisaged to reassert Turkey’s influence in the Bal-
kans – and, in particular, contribute toward creating 
bonds among the countries in the region – trilateral 
meetings were never structured to last.32 In fact, the 
meetings with Croatian counterparts never led to 
much, since Croatia has been moving toward the EU. 
Meetings with Serbia are presented as being much 
more vital, since most of the talks have been directed 
toward economic relations and the improvement of 
cooperation in this field. The actual results, though, 
appear to be mostly in the domain of politics. As 
Yasemin Eralp, First Counselor in the Turkish Embassy 
in BiH, Sarajevo, puts it: “There is no way to measure 
the impact of trilateral meetings, and their purpose is 
to bring a good atmosphere and foster dialogue.”33 
However, some results were evident. The foreign 
ministers of Turkey, BiH, and Serbia have come to-
gether nine times; the foreign ministers of Turkey, 
BiH, and Croatia have gathered four times since 2009. 
The highlight of these meetings was a first-ever 
meeting between Serbian President Boris Tadić and 
BiH President Haris Silajdžić. Consequently, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina sent an ambassador to Belgrade 
following a three-year absence. In 2010 the Serbian 
parliament adopted a declaration condemning the 
crimes in Srebrenica. Following the Trilateral Balkan 
Summit, held in Istanbul in April 2010, an Istanbul 
Declaration was adopted, but the consultations with 
Zagreb ceased after Croatia’s entry into the EU in July 
2013. In this period, a series of political crises and a 
number of diplomatic incidents had a negative impact 
on the trilateral meetings. In July 2014, the Turkish 
 
30  Kemal Kirişci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: 
The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives of Turkey, no. 40 
(2009): 29–57, http://bit.ly/2awfkNX (accessed 13 February 2016). 
31  There were seven meetings of foreign ministers from Tur-
key, BiH, and Serbia, and five foreign ministers from Turkey, 
BiH, and Croatia. 
32  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). 
33  Ibid. 
and Bosnian defense ministries planned a naval mili-
tary exercise in Neum, the only Bosnian sea exit. 
Although the visit of two Turkish military vessels had 
been arranged with representatives of the Bosniak/ 
Muslim side, Croatian and Serbian representatives in 
Bosnia’s presidency objected to this and decided not 
to allow the entry of the Turkish naval ships, which 
raised tensions in Bosnian political discourse. One of 
the two ships was named after the famous Turkish 
Grand Vizier, Sokullu Mehmed Pasha; for the Serbian 
and Croatian politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
this represented a hint at neo-Ottomanism. Already 
fractured relations between Serbian President Tomis-
lav Nikolić and Bosnian President Bakir Izetbegović 
deteriorated further in June 2015, when a Bosniak 
member of the presidency of BiH withdrew the invita-
tion given to the Serbian president to officially visit 
Sarajevo because of a dispute over war crimes. 
Interethnic tensions were additionally raised due to 
British insistence that the UN Security Council should 
pass a resolution on Srebrenica – the resolution came 
to an end by Russian veto in July 2015. To make sure 
that the resolution did not pass, Belgrade called Mos-
cow to veto the British proposal, which they did. 
Improving relations with Serbia through a series 
of meetings – after democratic parties gained power in 
October 2000 – was of utmost importance for Ankara.34 
Turkey has increasingly involved itself with Serbia’s 
Sandžak region by opposing the demands of some 
local activists for autonomy from Serbia, encouraging 
the region’s fractious Bosniak communities to settle 
their differences, and by opening a Turkish Cultural 
Center in Novi Pazar. In October 2013, however, much 
of it was spoiled, as Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić 
cancelled an announced trilateral meeting in response 
to then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state-
ment in Kosovo: “Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Koso-
vo.” Nikolić called it “an aggression without arms,” 
and for many it was obvious proof that Turkey is a 
one-sided actor in the Western Balkans. 
The AKP and Davutoğlu’s perception of the Western 
Balkan reached a climax in the autumn of 2009. In his 
speech at the opening ceremony of a conference on 
the Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities 
 
34  The Serbian president at that time, Boris Tadić, visited 
Turkey in 2007 and 2010; Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković 
visited Turkey in 2011. Turkish President Abdulah Gül visited 
Serbia in 2009; he was the first Turkish president to visit Ser-
bia since 1986. Former Prime Minister Erdoğan made a visit 
to Serbia in July 2010, when a visa free agreement between 
the two countries was signed. 
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Today in Sarajevo in October 2009, Davutoğlu set out 
that during much of ancient history, Alexandria – 
then part of the Roman Empire – had a peripheral 
role. However, “during the Ottoman state, the Balkan 
region became the center of world politics in the 16th 
century. This was the Golden Age of the Balkans.”35 He 
went on to propose that the Balkan countries could 
escape the destiny of being on the periphery or a vic-
tim of geostrategic competition between great powers 
by reestablishing the successes of the Ottoman period. 
In that sense, the Empire is seen as a positive example 
and as the model for the solution to ethnic and reli-
gious conflicts. 
Emphasizing the success and shared destines of Tur-
key and the Balkans, Davutoğlu claimed that “Serbo-
Croat” was the second-most-spoken language at the 
Sultan’s court in the 16th century. In similar fashion, 
President Erdoğan articulated his affection toward the 
region during his post-election speech in Ankara on 
the night of March 30, 2014: 
I wholeheartedly greet our 81 provinces as well as 
sister and friendly capitals and cities of the world. 
. . . I first want to express my absolute gratitude to 
my God for such a victory and a meaningful result. 
I thank my friends and brothers all over the world 
who prayed for our victory. I thank my brothers 
in Palestine who saw our victory as their victory. I 
thank my brothers in Egypt who are struggling for 
democracy and who understand our struggle very 
well. I thank my brothers in the Balkans, in Bosnia, 
in Macedonia, in Kosovo and in all cities in Europe 
who celebrate our victory with the same joy we 
have here.36 
However, Turkey’s domestic conflicts and its tarnished 
record regarding human rights and the rule of law – 
mostly during the second term of the Erdoğan presi-
dency from 2007 to 2013 – diminished its image inter-
nationally. The country presently is sacrificing the 
potential to serve as an example for modernization 
and development. A number of high-level corruption 
cases, an authoritarian style of leadership, attacks 
on the free media, the imprisonment of journalists, 
 
35  “Address by H. E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Republic of Turkey at the Opening Session of the 
Alliance of Civilizations’ First South East Europe Ministerial 
Conference” (14 December 2009), https://goo.gl/Nkmtzf. 
36  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s post-election speech delivered 
from the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) headquarters 
in Ankara on the night of 30 March 2014. 
human rights violations, renewed conflict with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),37 fragile security in 
the country, and the overall volatile political setting 
has diminished Turkey’s position as a role model. In 
July 2016, forces within the Turkish military attempt-
ed a coup, which has since dramatically changed the 
domestic political scene. A state of emergency has 
been declared and since renewed. Fethullah Gülen, a 
Muslim cleric who lives in self-exile in Pennsylvania, 
has been accused by Turkey of orchestrating the failed 
uprising. Gülen has for years been actively involved in 
debates concerning the future of the Turkish state – 
and Islam in the modern world – and his movement 
is particularly active in the areas of education (with 
schools in more than 140 countries), media, finance, 
and health clinics.38 It is also suggested the movement 
controls much of Turkey’s police and justice system. In 
mid-2013 Gülen openly criticized Erdoğan’s handling 
of Gezi Park39 demonstrators. Soon after, Erdoğan 
accused Gülen and his supporters of creating “a state 
within a state” and announced that educational cen-
ters run by the Gülen movement would be shut down. 
After July 15, 2016, the purge against Gülen sympa-
thizers continued, and hundreds of thousands of 
people are being fired, jailed, and will be prosecuted. 
Many intellectuals and scholars have been prohibited 
from leaving the country, and many of them still face 
uncertainties. Liberal, pluralist democracy, which had 
been the flagship of the AKP party only a decade ago, 
has profoundly changed, and so did its image. The EU 
currently seems like a very overstretched goal. Presi-
dent Erdoğan’s open distancing of Turkey from the 
EU has greatly contributed to this. “It is not the apoca-
lypse if they do not let us in the EU,” Erdoğan told 
reporters during a visit to Budapest this year.40 “To be 
a member of EU is not a ‘sine qua non’ for Turkey, it 
is not a must.”41 As Turkey’s prospects of joining the 
EU have deteriorated in the past few years, its relation-
ship with EU member states has too, and the mediat-
ing role of Turkey will not be as essential. 
 
37  Amnesty International, State of the World’s Human Rights, 
2015–2016, http://bit.ly/24paZ7n (accessed 25 July 2016). 
38  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). 
39  Amnesty International, Gezi Park Protests. Brutal Denial of 
the Right to Peaceful Assembly (London, October 2013), 4. 
40  Göknil Erbaş, EU’s Foreign Policy towards the Balkans and 
Future Prospects of Turkey’s Membership of EU for the Region (2014), 
http://bit.ly/2aDOc13 (accessed 27 May 2016). 
41  Murat Yetkin, “The EU’s Point of No Return with Turkey”, 
Hurriyet Daily News, 21 April 2016, http://bit.ly/2av36aJ (ac-
cessed 23 July 2016). 
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Turkey’s Economy and Non-state Actors in the Western Balkans 
 
Turkey’s economy bounced back from the global crisis 
with incredible growth of 9 percent in 2010. Gross 
domestic product per capita (purchasing power parity) 
has grown to $14,243 in 2010, from about $6,000 a 
decade earlier.42 The aim to establish and maintain 
not only cultural but also economic links that would 
secure its regional role and create a projection of 
power has occupied Turkish political circles. “Streng-
thening economic cooperation,” “improving economic 
ties,” and “possibilities for increasing Turkish invest-
ment in the region” have become common phrases in 
statements and speeches of Turkish politicians when 
visiting the Balkans, but the long-promised improve-
ments in the area of the economy have yet to materi-
alize. Until 2004, Turkey’s annual foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outflow to the Balkans was almost 
exclusively to Bulgaria and Romania. With an accel-
eration of liberalization in the Western Balkans and 
bilateral agreements with Turkey, channels have 
opened up.43 Turkey’s FDI flow of investment into 
the Balkan countries has been relatively diversified. 
In 2007, Albania alone received 42.2 percent of total 
outward FDI from Turkey. This can be attributed to 
foreign participation in the partial privatization 
of Albania’s public telecommunications company 
ALBtelecom, which was acquired by a Turkish con-
sortium in 2007.44 In 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became the largest FDI-recipient country in the region, 
reaching a record level of $61 million FDI in 2009. 
This large investment into the country was a reflec-
tion of the purchase by Turkish Airlines of 49 percent 
of BH Airlines of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, 
this deal was cancelled soon after. 
Despite Turkey’s increased investments into the 
region being significant some years, Turkey’s FDI out-
flows were insignificant compared to the investments 
from other countries.45 Overall investments by Turkey 
 
42  What Does Turkey Think? (see note 4). 
43  Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, “A Golden Age of Relations: Turkey 
and the Western Balkans during the AK Party Period”, Insight 
Turkey 16, no. 1 (2014): 103–25. 
44  Mustafa Çakir, “An Economic Analysis of the Relationship 
between Turkey and the Balkan Countries”, Adam Akademi 4, 
no. 2 (2014): 77–86. 
45  Ibid. 
abroad increased from €160 million in 2002 to €1.35 
billion in 2011, making its investments in the Balkans 
10 percent of its total FDI in 2011.46 The only excep-
tion to this is Kosovo, which in 2015 pushed Turkey to 
second place in the list of top 10 investors, having in-
vested €54.1 million47 in Kosovo.48 The distribution of 
investments across the region is quite unequal but is 
in line with Davutoğlu’s policy of creating close rela-
tions with Bosnia, the FYROM, Kosovo, and Albania.49 
In 2015, Turkey increased FDI in the region signifi-
cantly: €16.5 million50 in Albania, €32.1 million51 
in Bosnia, €10.1 million52 in Montenegro, €10.1 mil-
lion53 in the FYROM, €14.6 million54 in Serbia,55 and 
a record high €54.1 million56 in Kosovo.57 However, 
 
46  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Investment Country Profiles: Turkey, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/6 
(February 2012). 
47  Original Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support 
Agency data is denominated in dollars. Original figure is 
$54.1 million. The currency is converted by historic rates 
at http://bit.ly/2aKhoVN. 
48  Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support Agency, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Kosovo, 
http://invest-ks.org/en/foreign-direct-investments-in-kosovo 
(accessed 12 August 2106). 
49  Sait Akşit, An Alternative or Embedded in the Mainstream: Politi-
cal Economy of Turkey’s Involvement in the Balkans (Izmir: Gediz 
University, Department of International Relations, 2001), 16. 
50  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated in 
dollars. Original amount is $18 million. The currency is con-
verted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2aKhNYf. 
51  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated in 
dollars. Original amount is $35 million. The currency is con-
verted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2aDOrch. 
52  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated in 
dollars. Original amount is $11 million. The currency is con-
verted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2ajP52e. 
53  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated in 
dollars. Original amount is $11 million. The currency is con-
verted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2ajP52e. 
54  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated in 
dollars. Original amount is $16 million. The currency is con-
verted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2ajP52e. 
55  Turkish Central Bank, Electronic Data Delivery System, 
http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/. 
56  Original Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support 
Agency data is denominated in dollars. Original figure is 
$54 million. The currency is converted by historic rates at 
http://bit.ly/2aKhoVN. 
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Turkey’s total FDI amounted to €4.8 billion,58 making 
its investments in the entire Balkans slightly less than 
3 percent of its total FDI in 2015.59 A number of eco-
nomic and trade agreements, including free trade 
agreements,60 between Turkey and the countries in 
the region have been signed since 1999, but trade bal-
ance – just like investments – has not reached antici-
pated levels. For Turkey, the Western Balkan markets 
are not particularly attractive, the population is small, 
and the purchasing power is generally low. In the 
areas of external trade – around 60 percent of which 
is with the EU – capital investment, and banking, the 
Western Balkans mainly depends on Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Greece, France, and Hungary. Banks in the 
Western Balkans are mainly controlled by Italy, 
Austria, Greece, and France.61 
The dynamics of economic relations between Turkey 
and the Western Balkan countries have remained large-
ly unchanged over the last decade, despite emotional 
promises in political speeches across the Western Bal-
kans. Although Turkey has played an important 
political role in the region, its economic performance 
has not outperformed EU countries such as Italy and 
Germany, which have recorded by far the best results. 
As in a political forum, in economic terms Turkey 
projects to a certain extent the image that it supports 
only Muslims in the region. Rhetorically, the aim is to 
work holistically with everyone, but in reality Muslim 
groups receive special attention and benefits. The 
Yunus Emre Cultural Center has opened three offices 
in BiH, none of which are located in Republika Srpska. 
Out of 25 branch offices of the Turkish Ziraat Bank in 
BiH, only one is located in Republika Srpska, in Banja 
Luka.62 And of all the investments into large-scale pro-
duction, none have been made in Republika Srpska. 
 
57  Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support Agency, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Kosovo, 
http://bit.ly/2aP2oqN. 
58  Original Turkish Central Bank data is denominated 
in dollars. Original figure is $5.24 billion. The currency is 
converted by historic rates at http://bit.ly/2ax5O0r. 
59  Turkish Central Bank, Electronic Data Delivery System, 
http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/. 
60  Turkey has signed free trade agreements with all coun-
tries in the region, the first one as early as 1999 with FYROM, 
which came into force in 2000. Free trade agreements with 
Bosnia and Albania came into force in 2003 and 2008, re-
spectively, Montenegro and Serbia in 2010, and finally, in 
2013, Turkey signed a free trade agreement with Kosovo, too. 
61  Dušan Reljić, The West Balkans: Accessing the Union, SWP-
Point of View (Berlin: SWP, 28 August 2012), 3. 
62  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). 
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
(TIKA) has program coordination offices in almost all 
parts of the region. However, it is mostly active in the 
areas of the Balkans typically populated by Muslims. 
TIKA’s activity fund concentrates 50 to 70 percent of 
its resources to restoration. As a result, it has rebuilt 
or participated in the rebuilding of numerous monu-
ments of Ottoman cultural and historical significance 
in BiH – be it bridges, fountains, residences, or mosques 
– over a period of two decades. Yet, exact numbers that 
systematically testify to their activities are almost im-
possible to come by, as even TIKA itself does not keep 
track of significant cultural and historical monuments 
they assist in rebuilding.63 Unlike the other 22 major 
international donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, TIKA 
has not yet joined the work of the Donor Coordination 
Forum, established back in 2005 in order to increase 
aid-efficiency in BiH and strengthen BiH’s leadership 
in its own development. 
The Turkish Cultural Yunus Emre Centers64 have 
offices in Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Roma-
nia. These centers have been active in spreading the 
teaching of the Turkish language in public schools. 
As a result, in Sarajevo in the academic year of 2012/ 
2013, some primary and secondary schools started to 
offer Turkish as an elective course – 4,863 students 
have been taking those. Along with the Diyanet (Tur-
key’s “Presidency for Religious Affairs”) – which nour-
ishes religious relations, which in turn play a major 
role in relations between Turkey and the countries of 
the Western Balkans – the Gülen65 movement has 
been very active in the Balkans. But the movement has 
come under investigation in Bosnia, where, in 2016, 
public action has led to investigations of the way these 
schools were operating, which is in apparent disregard 
of domestic education rules and procedures. But 
no evidence of any breach has been found. The Gülen 
 
63  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). 
64  The Yunus Emre Foundation is a public foundation 
founded under the law dated 5 May 2007 and numbered 
5,653 to promote Turkey and its language, history, culture, 
and art. It makes related information and documents avail-
able for use across the world, provides services abroad to 
people who want education in Turkish language, culture, 
and art, and it improves relations between Turkey and other 
countries and increases cultural exchange, http://www.yee. 
org.tr. 
65  The Gülen movement (Hizmet in Turkish) is a worldwide 
civic initiative rooted in the spiritual and humanistic tra-
dition of Islam and inspired by the ideas and activism of 
Fethullah Gülen, http://bit.ly/2azrj1e. 
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movement also runs a number of schools in Albania, 
the FYROM, and Kosovo. 
Turkish media are also attempting to establish 
themselves in the Western Balkans. Turkey’s state-run 
broadcaster TRT now offers Internet news and radio 
programs in all languages in the Balkans; the Anadolu 
Agency news service in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
gained popularity. Much of these activities have be-
come vehicles for broadcasting Turkey’s religious 
credentials to Muslim audiences, both domestic and 
foreign. However, the Turkish entertainment industry 
has had the most success. Turkish soap operas have 
developed enthusiastic fan bases throughout Eastern 
Europe.66 Turkish soap operas are successfully broad-
cast beyond Turkey, reaching millions of people in 
more than 50 countries. According to the Turkish 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, when the soap operas 
first entered the world market, they were valued at 
€25,000–€35,000 per episode. Today, the programs 
sell for €145,000–€360,000 an episode. Turkish soap 
operas broadcast daily are very popular in BiH, with 
47 covering 2,235 minutes of programming on only 
one TV channel a week (which is exactly a day and a 
half every week of soap operas), enhancing Turkey’s 
soft power on the international stage by popularizing 
Turkish culture. The soap operas have changed per-
ceptions about present-day Turkish society in the 
Western Balkans. The image of Turks as modern, in-
dustrious people has countered the traditional image 
previously widespread in the region. 
 
 
 
66  Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin, Ender Demir, and Davor Labas, 
“The Impact of Turkish TV Series on Turkey’s Image: Evidence 
from Eastern Europe”, in Entrepreneurship, Business and Econom-
ics, vol. 1, ed. Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin and Hakan Danis 
(Cham: Springer, 2016), 565–78. 
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Turkish Military in the Balkans 
 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey initiated a treaty of 
friendship and cooperation in Ankara on February 28, 
1953: the Balkan Pact. The agreement was meant to 
provide mutual collaboration between the three coun-
tries. In 1954, the treaty was signed in Slovenia (of the 
former Yugoslavia). It was first and foremost Yugo-
slavia that aimed to promote increased cooperation 
because it had become completely isolated after the 
escalation of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, but the treaty 
never had its big moment and was rather a “dead 
letter.”67 Turkey’s membership in NATO, secured in 
1952,68 defined its defense policies. Having had a long 
history of insurgency and terrorism in the neighbor-
hood,69 Turkey has always had noteworthy military 
capabilities. In 2014, Turkish armed forces ranked 
10th globally with more than half a million service 
personnel – more than the militaries of France and 
the United Kingdom combined. In the Cold War era, 
Turkey’s main objective was to be an active player in 
the western union, to fulfil its obligation as a NATO 
member.70 After the 1990s, disintegration of the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Turkey’s defense 
policies were complemented by new goals.71 
Turkey dedicated significant military efforts to the 
Western Balkans in the 1990s, from Bosnia to Kosovo, 
 
67  Slobodan Stanković, “Is Yugoslavia’s Military Alliance 
with Greece and Turkey Still Legally Valid?”, Open Society 
Archives, 30 September 1968, http://bit.ly/2aTYxKI (accessed 
12 December 2015). 
68  “Turkey’s Relations with NATO”, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa (accessed 24 
February 2016). 
69  Turkey has been dealing with the Kurdish organisation 
PKK within its borders for more than 30 years. 
70  Çiğdem Üstün, Turkey and European Security Defence Policy, 
Compatibility and Security Cultures in a Globalised Wold, (London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 85 https://goo.gl/1nDW41 
(accessed 3 December 2016). 
71  Ministry of National Defence, White Book, Turkey (Ankara, 
2000), 35–6. The goals were: 1) to contribute to peace and 
security in the region and to spread it to larger areas, (2) to 
become a country producing strategy and security that can 
influence all the strategies concerning its geography and 
beyond, (3) to become an element of power and balance in 
its region, and (4) to make use of every opportunity and take 
initiatives for cooperation, coming closer together, and devel-
oping positive relations. 
and participated in peace operations in the region in 
the context of international organizations. It took part 
in the South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial pro-
cess, which was initiated in 1996. Vouching coopera-
tion between the countries of the region, Turkey helped 
initiate the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern 
Europe, known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade 
(SEEBRIG).72 
In Bosnia, Turkey actively participated in United 
Nations Protection Force activities. After the Dayton 
Agreement was signed in 1995, it increased its mili-
tary presence to brigade level for the transformed 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), which would 
become the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996.73 That 
same year, Turkey and Bosnia signed two bilateral 
agreements that established the cooperation between 
the two countries in the fields of military training, 
defense industry infrastructure, military technology, 
scientific research and development, and military 
medicine.74 The second agreement had two objectives: 
bring the Muslim-Croat forces up to equivalence with 
the Bosnian Serb Forces by the time IFOR leaves the 
country, and bring the Bosnian Army closer to NATO 
standards. The agreement implied regular visits by 
high-level officials and delegations; participation in 
exercises as observers; training of military personnel; 
and contributions to the Train and Equip Program.75 
Efforts to train the Bosnian army went hand-in-hand 
with the security concerns brought up by the United 
States regarding the presence of foreign fighters in 
Bosnia. Having the image of an unpredictable country 
with a weak state apparatus, Bosnia was considered 
fertile soil for Islamic extremists.76 Bosnian troops 
were trained by the Turks with American M60 tanks – 
 
72  Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era 
(see note 7). 
73  Metehan Demir, “Turkey’s Training of Bosnian Continues 
as Fate of the Federation Remains Hazy”, Turkish Daily News, 
30 August 1996, in Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold 
War Era (see note 7). 
74  “Turkey, Bosnia Sign Military Cooperation Accord”, Turkish 
Daily News, 12 August 1995, cited in Ekinci, Turkey and the Bal-
kans in the Post-Cold War Era (see note 7). 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid. 
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part of the $98.4 million worth of US military hard-
ware that was supposed to be shipped to Bosnia under 
the condition that all Iranian fighters would leave the 
country. Bosnian President Izetbegović had assured 
John Kornblum, the Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State, that Iranians would leave the country.77 
In line with the recovery made in the region, the 
number of military staff on the ground was shrinking, 
but Turkey remained involved. In 2004, the SFOR mis-
sion was handed over to the European Union Force, 
and 243 Turkish soldiers stayed in the country. Two 
years later, Turkey provided Bosnia with an opportu-
nity to participate as an observer in a Joint Battalion 
Task Force within NATO’s Partnership for Peace agree-
ment.78 In addition, in August 2006, Turkey and Bos-
nia signed another cooperation agreement aimed at 
enabling Bosnia to use a NATO anti-terror training base 
and to benefit from free access to the NATO-run base.79 
After the declaration of independence from Yugo-
slavia, the FYROM was weak, lacked international 
support and recognition, and was suffering due to an 
ethnic conflict and security threat from Greece. The 
country was in need of a strong and committed ally, 
and Turkey proved to be one: by 1994, Turkey had 
donated $1.9 million worth of military aid to the 
FYROM, including military equipment and ammu-
nition.80 By 2006, Turkey had donated a total of $15 
million worth of military equipment to the FYROM.81 
The donations aimed to support the FYROM’s efforts 
toward integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. In 
addition, Turkey led several operations in the FYROM: 
Essential Harvest,82 Amber Fox,83 Allied Harmony,84 
 
77  Ibid. 
78  Mustafa Aksaç, Turkey’s Military Efforts for Peace in the Balkans 
(Ankara: Bilkent University, The Department of International 
Relations, 2003), 115. 
79  “Bosnia, Turkey Sign Military Agreement”, Agence France-
Presse, 14 August 2006, cited in Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in 
the Post-Cold War Era (see note 7). 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Operation Essential Harvest was conducted to disarm the 
armed forces in the FYROM. Essential Harvest ended on 27 
September 2001, and the Turkish Company Team returned 
to Turkey on 6 October 2001. 
83  NATO formed a new power to support the international 
observers in Macedonia and started conducting Operation 
Amber Fox on 27 September 2001. Turkey served as the head-
quarters for this mission. 
84  Operation Allied Harmony started immediately after the 
completion of the previous operation and continued under 
the command of NATO until 31 March 2003. It was supported 
with staff personnel. 
Concordia,85 and Proxima.86 The main goal of this 
support had been the development of the defense 
capacities of the FYROM and its eventual accession 
into NATO. To achieve this goal, Turkey has remained 
the biggest non-EU contributor within the EU’s 
Common Security and Defense Policy missions and 
operations in the FYROM. 
Military relations between Turkey and Albania 
began in the early 1990s. A defense cooperation pact 
was signed between the two countries in 1992 in 
Ankara, Turkey. On this occasion – and despite the 
fact that Albania was not a NATO member – Albanian 
Defense Minister Safet Zhulali visited top-secret 
Turkish military facilities that only NATO members 
were allowed to see. Only a month later, the Turkish 
naval vessel TCG Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak visited Durres, 
the biggest Albanian port. This was the first such visit 
since Ottoman times. Six years after the historic visit 
to Albania, in 1998, Turkey sent troops to this country 
at a time when the conflict in Kosovo had escalated, 
and Kosovo officials sought support in Turkey. NATO 
launched airstrikes on Serbia and Monte Negro in 
1999 and Turkey participated in these NATO airstrikes. 
Later on, Turkey contributed to the international 
peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo, with around 
1,000 soldiers being deployed in July 1999. Turkey 
made its military air facilities available to NATO for 
the Alliance’s attacks, as well as supplied F-16 fighter 
jets as escorts for the squads of bombers. Turkish offi-
cials remained silent about Turkey’s direct partici-
pation in the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo.87 Soon after 
NATO stopped the airstrikes, Kosovo was placed under 
UN administration. UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 authorized the establishment of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo and the deployment of the 
NATO-led Kosovo Force. Turkey wanted an active role 
in post-war Kosovo through the peacekeeping mission 
as well as the reconstruction and development of 
the country.88 In 2009, Turkey and Kosovo signed the 
Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement committing 
 
85  Turkey contributed to the operation, which was taken 
over and conducted by the EU under the name “Concordia” 
on 15 December 2003 with personnel support. 
86  Turkey assigned gendarmerie personnel to Proxima Police 
Power, established by the EU in Macedonia on 15 December 
2003, and the personnel accomplished its mission on 15 Decem-
ber 2005. 
87  Sylvie Gangloff, “Turkish Policy towards the Conflict in 
Kosovo: The Preeminence of National Political Interests”, Bal-
kanologie 8, no. 1 (June 2004): 105–22. 
88  Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era 
(see note 7). 
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them to the implementation of joint research, devel-
opment, production, and modernization of spare 
parts, tools, instruments, defense materials, military 
systems, technical displays, and technical equipment, 
as well as military visits to unit headquarters and 
institutions.89 Recently, Turkey has contributed to 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 
and its presence was 150 personnel strong in 2011.90 
In Bosnia, the FYROM, and Kosovo, where ethnic 
issues were particularly sensitive, Turkey worked 
closely with the United States.91 It only signed mili-
tary agreements with the FYROM and Bosnia after 
the United States got involved in the settlement of the 
conflict in Bosnia and recognized the FYROM.92 To 
remain an important factor in the decision-making 
processes, and to promote itself in the Western Bal-
kans, Turkey was led by the United States for most of 
its decisions and worked hand-in-hand with Washing-
ton in the planning of its regional diplomacy. It was 
only after the United States got involved in the settle-
ment of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1994–1995 – and after it recognized the FYROM (Re-
public of Macedonia) and signed military agreements 
with the latter – that Turkey itself took the step of 
signing military agreements with Macedonia (April 
1995 and July 1996) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Au-
gust 1995 and January 1996). Again in the spring of 
1998, when the increasing repression in Kosovo moti-
vated the deepening of military cooperation between 
Macedonia and NATO, Turkey, too, strengthened its 
own military cooperation with Skopje. Like the United 
States, Turkey supported Albania, Macedonia, and the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation, politically and militarily. 
Throughout the military engagement in the Western 
Balkans, Turkey was always forced to integrate its 
activities into EU and US policies in order to remain 
a player in the region. 
 
 
 
89  Nuri Sener, Turkey’s Soft Power Assets in Peacekeeping 
Operations (Calhoun, June 2015). 
90  Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations 
document, January 2016, http://docslide.us/documents/csdp-
missions-and-operations.html (accessed 27 May 2016). 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
 SWP Berlin 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
December 2016 
 
 
 
18 
Countries of Particular Interest to Turkey 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The legacy of Ottoman rule profoundly marked Bos-
nia’s society and some of its most prominent features 
– for example, Islam as its religious heritage, Ottoman-
influenced art, and 6,87893 common Turkish words – 
are some of the reasons why Bosnia (in the words of 
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davu-
toğlu) is the “miniature of the Balkans,” and why Sara-
jevo especially holds a very special place in the hearts 
of Turks.94 According to polls, a majority of the citi-
zens of BiH, as much as 60.2 percent, see Turkey as 
being a friendly country.95 At the same time, this fond-
ness is, according to statistics, more pronounced 
among Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), as 72.5 percent of 
them like Turkey the most out of all foreign countries 
and would most want to live there in a hypothetical 
case of living abroad.96 
After the early 1990s, Turkey’s interest was directed 
in particular toward BiH. In 1992, during the Bosnian 
War, Turkey was particularly worried by the Bosnian 
conflict. A number of parliamentary sessions were 
dedicated to the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia. The oppo-
sition parties criticized Turkey’s “inaction” during 
the war and advocated a unilateral intervention in 
Bosnia97 and for Turkey to position itself as an ally of 
Bosnian Muslims. Even though Ankara was adamant 
about who the aggressor and who the victims were, 
the government mostly followed a line of action that 
was within the NATO framework.98 It offered diplo-
 
93  Abdulah Škaljić, Turcizmi u srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku [Turkish 
expressions in Serbo-Croatian language], 6th issue (Sarajevo, 
1989). 
94  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14), 5. 
95  A survey conducted by the Wise Men Center for Strategic 
Studies (BILGESAM) on how Turkey and Turkish people are 
perceived in the Balkans. The survey was carried out at differ-
ent universities in the countries, with respondents including 
both students and academics, and involved 2,127 face-to-face 
interviews (June, 2012). 
96  Ibid. 
97  Didem Ekinci, “The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Turkish Parliamentary Debates (1992–1995): A Constructivist 
Approach”, Uluslararası İlişkiler 6, no. 22 (Summer 2009): 37–60. 
98  Think tank Populari, A Political Romance (see note 14). Popu-
lari interview with Kemal Hakkı Kılıç, Head of the Balkans 
matic and public support to the authorities in Sara-
jevo, as it was reluctant to completely sever relations 
with Serbia.99 Turkey’s political elites acknowledged 
that it was the Muslims who were being killed on 
European soil, thus there was a legitimate call for 
Turkey to defend one of its kin communities. In 1992, 
President Süleyman Demirel made a powerful speech 
calling for more assertive action: “I can say a new wave 
of bloodshed is coming. I stated my worries to world 
leaders after my return from Bosnia. I continue to 
voice the drama of our Bosnian brothers at every inter-
national forum and bilateral contacts.”100 In spite of 
internal instability and the opposition parties’ advo-
cating unilateral intervention in Bosnia, at the time, 
Turkish foreign policy remained in line with its obli-
gations as a NATO member rather than being based 
solely on sympathies with the suffering of their Mus-
lim brethren or nationalistic identities. Shuttle diplo-
macy and multilateral initiatives on the international 
platforms arguing for the necessity of international 
military measures were the focal points of Turkey’s 
efforts. International conferences, meetings held 
around the globe, and calls by Turkey for multilateral 
intervention were its principal tools at the time. After 
the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in 
Bosnia in 1995, and throughout the 1996 Priority 
Reconstruction and Recovery Program, Turkey com-
mitted €39.8 million – or about a tenth of the amount 
committed by the European Community.101 
In public discourse and with some diplomatic hic-
cups,102 both countries have built strong relations. 
 
Department within Diyanet, Ankara, Turkey, 21 October 
2013. 
99  Ekinci, “The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkish 
Parliamentary Debates” (see note 97). 
100  Sami Süleyman Gündoğdu Demirel was a Turkish poli-
tician and statesman who served as the ninth president of 
Turkey from 1993 to 2000. He previously served as the prime 
minister of Turkey five times between 1965 and 1993. He was 
the leader of the Justice Party (AP) from 1964 to 1980 and the 
leader of the True Path Party (DYP) from 1987 to 1993. 
101  United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Bosnia 
Peace Operation: Progress toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s 
Goals (Washington, D.C., May 1997). 
102  The relations between the two countries were rocky 
when Bosnia decided to establish diplomatic relations with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
SWP Berlin 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
December 2016 
 
 
 
19 
Matching and even amplifying Turkish expressions 
of affection, Bosniak politicians also recognize the im-
portance of nurturing the image of a special connec-
tion between the two countries and their peoples. 
Members of the Bosnian presidential administration 
agree on a rhetorical level that bilateral relations 
between Bosnia and Turkey are good, and strong, but 
refer to Turkey as an older, more experienced brother, 
as strong and wise. Bosniak officials have embraced 
Turkey as a role model – unlike their other col-
leagues103 – and enjoy direct access to Ankara.104 
Having three presidents that rotate periodically (Serb, 
Croat, and Bosniak), Bosnia is in a peculiar position, 
and relations require even more sensitivity than 
Turkey has shown. A positive sentiment among 
Muslims in Bosnia, who consider the Ottoman period 
to be the golden age of Bosnia and see it as the 
birthplace of their religious identity, Serbs and Croats 
– both Christian – are not at ease with it. Whereas 
Bosniaks perceive this as friendly rhetoric, proof of 
friendship, and brotherhood, Serbs and Croats in 
Bosnia feel uncomfortable with it, to say the least. As a 
result, in the words of Milorad Dodik, the President of 
Republika Srpska, one of the two entities105 in Bosnia, 
the “Turkish presence creates more internal divi-
sions.” Its open affiliation with Bosniaks only makes 
compromise harder than necessary. Bosniak affiliation 
is based on the memorialization of Alija Izetbegović in 
Turkey, which honors him with several parks, 
 
the Greek Cypriots in February 2000, but also to impose a 
visa obligation on Turkish citizens. The Bosnian Ministry of 
Human Rights decided to do so on the grounds that many 
Turks had illegally passed through Bosnia to go to other 
countries in Europe. The Bosnian officials stated that approxi-
mately 6,000 Turks were recorded as having passed via Bosnia 
to European countries. Former Ambassador Ahmet Erozan 
duly expressed Turkey’s concern by stating that this develop-
ment would harm relations after the decision to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Greek Cypriots. Erozan also 
stated that Turkey would do the same if Bosnia did not alter 
its decision. By 2005, Turkey included Bosnia along with 
Macedonia, Tunisia, Iran, Morocco, and Kyrgyzstan in its list 
of states subject to visas in accordance with the adjustment 
process with the EU. The European Commission had called 
upon Turkey to revise its visa regime in its 2004 Regular 
Report.  
103  Ekinci, Turkey and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era 
(see note 7). 
104  “Erdoğan Uses Atatürk’s Yacht for First Time to Host 
Bosnian Leader”, Hurriyet Daily News, 4 March 2015, http:// 
bit.ly/17USluQ (accessed 26 August 2015). 
105  Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises two entities: the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska. 
mosques, streets, and even boulevards in major 
Turkish cities. To add further reservation, Muzaffer 
Çilek, an Honorary Consul of Bosnia to Bursa and the 
CEO of a furniture company, was appointed a senior 
advisor to Bakir Izetbegović, a Bosniak Member of the 
Presidency of Bosnia.106 In Bosnia, Çilek founded the 
foundation BİGMEV (Development center of cultural, 
economic and scientific relations between countries 
associated with Bosnia and Herzegovina)107 in order to 
establish and vitalize historical relations between 
Turkey and BiH by maintaining established links and 
enhancing economic relations and trade.108 Çilek’s 
close links with Turkey’s ruling AKP party intensified 
relations in the country’s political forum. As part of 
Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, Izetbegović took 
part in a teleconference with Erdoğan, during which 
he stated that if Erdoğan were elected president, he 
would not only act as president of Turkey but also as 
president of Bosnia, president of all Muslims. “You 
have restored the pride, the dignity of the Islamic 
nation. Therefore, here we all stand before you, out 
of respect for the first-class Muslim leader. Therefore, 
raise the flag high for our leader, for our Prime Minis-
ter Tayyip Erdoğan. He carries our flag, he carries our 
pride, [and] he carries the flag the late Izetbegović car-
ried in the Bosnian bloody war,” Izetbegović said in his 
address.109 
The public in the square and AKP supporters cheered 
his statements, but at home in Bosnia, Izetbegović was 
met with harsh criticism within many circles, includ-
ing his own party, the Party of Democratic Action. Reci-
procity came shortly after, when the AKP and Erdoğan 
himself threw their full support110 behind Izetbego-
 
106  “Turkish Businessman Appointed as Advisor to the Presi-
dent of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Daily Sabah, 30 April 2015, 
https://goo.gl/exdLR2 (accessed 12 August 2016). 
107  BİGMEV (Bosna Hersek ile İlişkileri Geliştirme Merkezi 
Vakfı) was established in 2010 and has a vision to “reviv[e] […] 
old relations between [BiH] and Turkey” through an increase 
in investments and trade. It offers different services in sup-
port of linking BiH with Turkish businessmen and vice versa. 
The president of BİGMEV’s Managing Board is Muzaffer Çilek, 
a prominent Turkish businessman, whose ancestors came to 
Turkey from BiH. Aside from the central office in Istanbul, 
BİGMEV also has offices in Bursa and Sarajevo. 
108  Ibid. 
109  At the promotion of a book titled Recep Tayyip Erdogan – 
the Birth of a Leader in Visoko, Izetbegović addressed Erdoğan 
(who was speaking at an election rally in central Turkey) by 
way of video link. 
110  Hamdi Fırat Büyük, “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Risks Back-
firing in Balkans”, Balkan Insight, 26 February 2016, http:// 
goo.gl/eH8Qne (accessed 14 April 2016). 
Countries of Particular Interest to Turkey 
SWP Berlin 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
December 2016 
 
 
 
20 
vić’s incumbent second-term run for the Bosniak seat 
of Bosnia’s Presidency, a move that greatly helped him 
retain the post. Just before the Bosnian general elec-
tions of 2014, the Bosnian branch of Turkey’s state-
owned Ziraat Bank granted the state of Bosnia a loan 
of $50 million, and Izetbegović was there to receive 
the new line of credit with all the spectacle that could 
be expected to accompany such a transaction. More-
over, the Balkan service of Turkey’s state-owned Ana-
dolu Agency offered its full support to Izetbegović 
during his presidential campaign.111 
Turkey’s efforts to bring Bosnia closer to NATO cul-
minated when Foreign Minister Davutoğlu held talks 
with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of 
NATO and EU term president; Spanish Foreign Minis-
ter Miguel Angel Moratinos; and then President of BiH 
Silajdžić to help Bosnia’s participation in the Member-
ship Action Plan (MAP).112 The Turkish embassy served 
as a NATO contact for Bosnia while also acting as a 
mentor in the process. Although this role is usually 
assumed by a NATO member for a duration of one 
year, Turkey has – based on its explicit expression of 
strong interest – been able to keep it for two consecu-
tive years. NATO foreign ministers had assured Bosnia 
that the country would be included in the MAP if they 
made the necessary reforms. Having no influence over 
Republika Srpska – a Serb-majority populated area and 
an entity of Bosnia – Turkey113 was left with no lever-
age in further negotiations between the two entities to 
deliver reforms. A compromise has not been reached, 
and Bosnia to date has not taken part in the MAP. 
Turkey also considered itself as a bridge between 
Bosnia and the international community. Its fierce 
lobbying for Bosnia to gain membership in the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe was 
one way to demonstrate that.114 Being outside the EU, 
 
111  Ibid. 
112  The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO pro-
gramme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored 
to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the 
Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any 
decision by the Alliance on future membership. 
113  İnan Rüma, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: 
Overestimated Change within Underestimated Continuity?”, 
in Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy, ed. 
Özden Zeynep Oktav (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 135–57. 
114  Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-
Hercegovina”, in Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order, 
ed. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: 
Eren, 1995), cited in Dilek Barlas, “Turkey and the Balkans: 
Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold War Periods”, 
Turkish Review of Balkan Studies (Foundation for Middle East and 
Turkey’s involvement often came from the “back 
doors.” Represented through the Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation (OIC)115 and the Steering Board of 
the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)116 in the 2009 
debate on the future of the international governing 
body, the Office of the High Representative (OHR),117 
and its closure,118 Turkey’s stance effectively blocked 
Bosnia’s EU membership bid119 and the EU fast track. 
The closure of the OHR is a sensitive issue in Bosnia. 
Although Bosniak politicians propagate the continua-
tion of the office – associating its presence with the 
overall security and stability of Bosnia – Bosnian Serbs 
believe it is an institution that effectively blocks the 
country, both domestically and internationally, and 
that it is being run by foreigners from the outside. 
Admitting that Bosnia represents a complicated situa-
tion for Ankara, Turkey argued that conditions have 
not yet matured enough to end the mission of the 
international institution. Having voted against the 
closure of the OHR, Ankara augmented its influence 
with Bosniaks, as they have continually sought a 
strong protector. To this date, Bosnia is not a fully 
sovereign state as, nominally, the UN retains decisive 
prerogatives. 
 
Balkan Studies), 4 (Annual 1989/99): 65–80 (74, note 4). 
115  According to the official website of the OIC (formerly 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference), it is the second 
largest inter-governmental organisation after the United 
Nations and has membership of 57 states spread over four 
continents. The organisation is the collective voice of the 
Muslim world, ensuring to safeguard and protect the inter-
ests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting interna-
tional peace and harmony among various people of the world. 
The organisation was established upon a decision of the 
historical summit, which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of 
Morocco, on 25 September 1969. Since 1994, Bosnia is an 
observing rather than a member state, whereas Turkey is a 
full member of the OIC since 1969. 
116  The PIC comprises of 55 countries and agencies that sup-
port the Bosnia peace process. Its Steering Board specifically 
is mandated with overseeing the implementation of the Day-
ton Peace Agreement and providing political guidance to the 
High Representative. It has 11 members, one of which is the 
OIC, which is represented by Turkey. 
117  The Office of the High Representative is an ad hoc inter-
national institution responsible for overseeing the imple-
mentation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.ohr.int 
(accessed 16 June 2016). 
118  European Stability Initiative, Bosnia Herzegovina and the EU 
(Berlin, 2014). 
119  Goran Tirak, The Bosnian Hiatus: A Story of Misinterpretations, 
CEPS Policy Brief, no. 219 (Brussels: CEPS, November 2010), 
http://bit.ly/2aQ7nry (accessed 16 June 2016). 
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By the time most international donors were leaving 
Bosnia, Turkey had increased its TIKA budget, but al-
most 95 percent of project applications submitted to 
TIKA came from the part of the country with a Muslim 
majority – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
One parliament representative, Dušanka Majkić, an 
ethnic Serb, said that there are no hard facts that speak 
in favor of Turkey showing interest in the economy of 
Republika Srpska. “Politically speaking, Turkey hasn’t 
shown readiness to understand the other two sides 
[Serbs and Croats]. Rather, it is exclusively supporting 
the Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslims].” Yunus Emre and the 
Diyanet, Turkey’s Presidency for Religious Affairs, are 
also heavily involved in Bosnia, with projects ranging 
from language courses120 to modernizations of reli-
gious schools. With several universities and more than 
2,000 registered nationals, Turks comprise around a 
quarter of all foreigners with temporary residence in 
Bosnia. Under the slogan “Parade of little Sultans” 
connecting Turkey and BiH, the Sarajevo-based NGO 
Istanbul Educational and Cultural Center and the 
Eskişehir Turkish World Culture Capital Agency for 
several years now have been organizing public cer-
emonies for the circumcision of young boys. This kind 
of state-supported ceremony raised questions about 
considerably different preferences toward practicing 
Islamic culture and tradition, even among Muslims 
who practice the ritual, exposing considerable differ-
ences concerning a Turkish presence among the Bos-
nian public. 
On the economic front, Turkey has not been among 
the top investing countries in Bosnia, contrary to rheto-
ric from Turkey’s and Bosnia’s political elites. The fol-
lowing graph shows the countries that invested the 
most in Bosnia over the last decade.121 
According to the data from BiH’s Central Bank on 
total investments from 1994 to December 2015, the 
country that has invested the most is the Republic 
of Austria (€1.3 billion). It is followed by Serbia and 
Croatia with €1.1 million each and Russia (€502 mil-
lion). Overall, the total investment over the period 
was €6.2 billion. 
 
120  Anadoly Agency, “Turski jezik izborni predmet i u ško-
lama Unsko-sanskog kantona” [Turkish Language Optional 
Language in Una Sana Canton Schools], faktor.ba, 12 Novem-
ber 2015, https://goo.gl/tzQf18 (accessed 16 June 2016). Turk-
ish language has become an optional foreign language in 
some Bosnian public schools.  
121  Central Bank of Bosnia, http://www.cbbh.ba/?lang=en 
(accessed 30 May 2016). 
Top investor countries in BiH,  
May 1994 – December 2015 (in mil. €) 
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Looking at trade, the Chamber of Commerce of Bos-
nia reported that 2015 exports to Turkey increased by 
51.26 percent when compared to 2014 and amounted 
to €181.3 million.122 The total volume of foreign trade 
with Turkey amounted to €459.3 million.123 Still, the 
EU and countries in the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) remain the most important trade 
partners for Bosnia. In 2015, as in previous years, Tur-
key was Bosnia’s ninth largest trade partner after Ger-
many, Italy, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Austria, China, 
and the Russian Federation.124 Turkey attempted to 
upend this ranking by signing in April 2006 the Joint 
Action Plan between the Union of Chambers and Com-
modity Exchanges of Turkey and the Foreign Trade 
Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was supposed 
to train Bosnians within the framework of the Turkey 
Chamber Development Programme but it did not yield 
significant results. 
In Bosnia and its contemporary setting – where the 
constitutional framework defines three different con-
stituent peoples; where the burden of dividing every-
thing by three is an inevitability; and where political 
leaders have deep disagreements about the future, and 
even the benefits, of Bosnia’s very existence – any im-
pression that an external actor, in this case Turkey, is 
 
122  “Smanjen vanjskotrgovinski deficit BiH: Izvoz u Tursku 
povećan za više od 50 posto” [External Trade Deficit Decreased: 
Export to Turkey Increased for over 50 Percent], Faktor maga-
zine, 10 February 2016, https://goo.gl/QQH28j (accessed 30 May 
2016). 
123  Foreign Trade Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://komorabih.ba/en/ (accessed 30 May 2016). 
124  Ibid. 
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favoring one ethnic group increases tensions. In the 
words of Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, 
Bosniaks keep on calling for a leader and a Muslim 
headquarters. Certainly this is not acceptable for Serbs 
or Croats. 
We cannot accept the values promoted by Erdogan 
and trust his impartiality when he is trying to sug-
gest to the Muslims to live with Serbs and Croats, 
while in fact he wants a dominant position for the 
Muslims here and wants BiH for them only.  . . . For 
us, who see this on a regular basis, President Izet-
begović’s subservient desire to invite some strong 
Muslim leader from the outside who would always 
be on the side of the Muslims in BiH, should not 
be a surprise.125 
Unlike Turkey’s effectiveness in employing cultural 
transformation and the overall visibility of using soft 
power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is not the case 
with economics. In a persistently poor economic en-
vironment, with unemployment rates rising to 60 per-
cent among the youth, Turkey plays no leading role 
and rates worse than countries that claim no special 
cultural, historical, or religious bonds to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Kosovo 
After years of strained relations with Serbia, during 
the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and in February 2008, 
when Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence 
from Serbia, Turkey decided to pursue a lower diplo-
matic profile than it had during the Bosnian War. 
Turkey was cautious of any parallels being drawn to 
its own Kurdish problem.126 Following after the proc-
lamation of independence, Turkish diplomats made 
their position clear. Deputy Prime Minister Ali Baba-
can stated that Turkey welcomed the independence of 
Kosovo, while underscoring the importance of improv-
ing regional and bilateral relations between Turkey 
and Serbia.127 Turkey recognized Kosovo a day after 
 
125  “Izetbegović Calls for Turkish Involvement”, Serbian Press 
Agency, 10 August 2012. 
126  Nick Danforth, “Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Problem’ – Then and 
Now”, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia, PA), 
5 January 2016. 
127  “Statement of H. E. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Regarding the Recognition 
of Kosovo by Turkey”, 18 February 2008. 
the declaration of independence in 2008, on February 
19, 2008. 
As in Bosnia, there are different views on how Tur-
key’s influence plays out in Kosovo. One side views 
Turkey as a friendly country that brings in cultural 
and economic values and perspectives, the other 
side views Turkey as being predominantly active in 
Kosovo’s political life and openly making political 
demands of the government in Kosovo. 
In the economic arena, Turkey signed the Agree-
ment on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments in April 2006. That same year, a holding compa-
ny, Özer Konveyor Bant, opened a Scotch Tape factory 
in Kosovo. With the signing of a free trade agreement, 
the €73 million trade volume was expected to grow 
rapidly. Turkish Airlines flies to Kosovo three or four 
times a week, facilitating trade activities, and Turkey 
is one of a handful of countries Kosovans can visit 
without a visa. 
Turkey’s political and cultural presence and influ-
ence in Kosovo has been accompanied by lively eco-
nomic relations between the two countries. Turkey, 
however, was not among the top five countries 
investing in Kosovo.128 
Of the six countries in the Western Balkans, Kosovo 
has attracted the highest level of FDI from Turkey over 
last five years. Only in 2015 did Kosovo attract €316.3 
million in FDI.129 Turkey placed second, with an FDI 
share of €54.1 million, immediately behind Switzer-
land, which invested €70.3 million the same year.130 
There are 62 Turkish-owned businesses in Kosovo’s 
dynamic business environment of almost 4,000 regis-
tered investors.131 
In terms of investments, and according to the Cen-
tral Bank of Kosovo, Turkey invested €86.8 million in 
2013 alone. From 2004 to 2014 investments amounted 
to €360 million – 12 percent of total foreign invest-
ments. Similarly, as with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Turkey has signed a free trade agreement as well as a 
number of different agreements eliminating double 
taxation. Kosovo’s main trade partners as of December 
2015 were CEFTA countries, which had a 35.4 percent 
share of overall Kosovo exports and a 24.6 percent 
share of imports; and the EU, which had a 20 percent 
 
128  Kosovo Investment and Enterprise Support Agency, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Kosovo, 
Foreign Direct Investments in Kosovo, http://bit.ly/2aw1qeX 
(accessed 22 May 2106). 
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Ibid. 
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export share and a 43 percent import share.132 With 
its 4.3 percent share of Kosovo exports, Turkey places 
ninth after India, Albania, Serbia, the FYROM, Ger-
many, and Switzerland.133 When it comes to import 
figures, the situation is slightly different. Turkey’s 
share of Kosovo imports is 12 percent, placing them 
immediately after Serbia, which imports 12.7 per-
cent.134 Allegations are that millions of euros are flow-
ing from Turkey to Kosovo “through illegal routes, by-
passing banks.”135 Dozens of new mosques in Kosovo, 
as well as the rebuilding of all the mosques from 
the period of the Ottoman occupation, are financed 
through one sole donor, the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency. In the absence of official data on 
how much money is being invested, the Central Bank 
of Kosovo shows TIKA invested less than €3 million in 
Kosovo from 2009 until 2014 – of that, €1.2 million 
was invested in the Sinan Pasha mosque in Prizren 
alone. 
Even though Turkey plays a role in the economic 
development of the country, the trade balance and 
amount of FDI are not at the levels that both govern-
ments had hoped for. Capital investments in infra-
structure, such as a new terminal in the Priština Adem 
Jashari International Airport, primarily served politi-
cal purposes. The airport terminal was officially opened 
in October 2013, when then Prime Minister Erdoğan 
visited Priština and turned the ceremony into a politi-
cal rally.136 Soon after, the company that owned the 
airports in Skopje, Priština, and Tirana was sold to a 
French company.137 Although the investments, dona-
tions, and development aid are welcome in impover-
ished Kosovo, where 50 percent of the workforce is 
unemployed, these do not come for free. The first 
Turkish envoy to Kosovo138 told local media that Kos-
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ovans and Albanians ought to revise their views of the 
Ottoman period, since “the Ottoman conquest was no 
invasion.” The same year, Rame Buja, the Minister of 
Education in Kosovo, reported that Turkey’s education 
minister requested that schoolbooks and other histori-
cal accounts revise their interpretations of the Otto-
man period to show the Empire in a less negative light. 
After similar requests from other high-level Turkish 
officials, Kosovo’s education minister tasked a com-
mission in 2011 to review the presentation of Otto-
man and Turkish history and culture in textbooks. 
What started as a request soon turned into a white-
washing of the historical records of the Ottoman 
Empire in schoolbooks. At Turkey’s request, Kosovo 
education officials were making changes to history 
textbooks to tone down the language describing the 
Ottoman Empire. Revisions captured a conciliatory 
note toward the Balkans’ former imperial master of 
450 years. Where eighth-graders in the year prior had 
learned how “at the end of the 19th century, Albani-
ans were still subject to a cruel Ottoman rule,” from 
that year onward the pupils would learn that “at the 
end of the 19th century, Albanians were still under 
Ottoman rule.” One “cruel and shrewd” sultan became 
“strict and shrewd” in the new version of an 11th 
grade textbook. Twelfth-graders used to read that the 
Ottomans dissolved the League of Prizren – a move-
ment for Albanian autonomy within the Empire – and 
“inflicted previously unseen terror.” The terror refer-
ence was replaced by a much milder “political repres-
sion.” Other revisions included the deletion of sen-
tences such as “Ottomans killed many Albanians,” 
whereas statements such as “They applied strict meas-
ures against non-Muslim people” were replaced with 
more pliable “All subjects in the countries conquered 
by the Ottoman Empire were equal before the law in 
everyday life.”139 
These changes were delivered in time for the 2012 
school year and incited public debate and polarized 
Kosovo citizens. When rumors surfaced in Albania 
that Turkey had made similar requests regarding that 
country’s textbooks, the Albanian-language press pub-
lished a letter signed by 127 intellectuals from Kosovo 
and Albania. “The proposed changes to history text-
books represent a form of cultural aggression against 
the essence of our nation,” the letter said. 
Kosovo’s Ministry of Education and some historians 
defended these alterations, saying that Kosovo should 
strive for more European standards, combating the 
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prevalent tendency in the Balkans to use textbooks to 
whip up nationalism and to stoke resentment of his-
torical enemies. “It’s very important to understand 
that the empire wasn’t Turkish, but Ottoman,”140 said 
Shkelzen Raca, the chairman of a commission that 
recommended changes to the history texts of primary 
and secondary schools in 2016. This argument did not 
fail as a remind that Turkey was among the first coun-
tries to recognize Kosovo following its unilateral split 
from Serbia in 2008. 
Macedonia 
The second-largest city in Macedonia, Bitola, a place 
where Ataturk – the founding father of modern Tur-
key – lived and studied, is almost an inevitable stop on 
the journey for many Turks.141 Estimates say that six 
million people living in Turkey today have ancestors 
who live in Macedonia. 
In the 1990s, when Macedonia declared independ-
ence from the former Yugoslav republic in 1991, the 
two nations embarked on much closer relations. Joint 
animosity toward Greece made this cooperation even 
stronger. With a provisional name of the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia in order to become a mem-
ber of the UN, Macedonia tightened relations with 
Turkey, which earned the unwavering loyalty of many 
Macedonians after Ankara became the second country 
– Bulgaria was first – to publicly support Skopje’s dec-
laration of independence and use of the name Macedo-
nia in 1991.142 
Especially positive about the relations of the two 
countries was former Macedonian President Kiro Gli-
gorov. He saw Turkey as one of the key states that 
would shape peace in the Balkans and described the 
recognition of Macedonia by Turkey as a very positive 
step. His affirmative approach toward Turkey and his 
style in foreign policy had been particularly important 
in maintaining the fragile domestic peace in the coun-
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try.143 Turkey had extended help in the winter of 1992, 
which has not been forgotten by the Macedonians, 
when the country faced the Greek embargo.144 
As a state that had just declared its independence in 
September 1991, Macedonia had to face an amalgam 
of economic, political, and military weakness. It could 
not receive aid or borrow on the financial markets, 
as it was not officially recognized. Therefore, Turkey’s 
provision of oil and humanitarian aid in this period 
proved vital for Macedonia. Former Foreign Minister 
Hikmet Çetin’s landmark visit to Macedonia in late 
1993 brought certain projects to life, such as the East-
West Motorway passing through Albania, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey. By 1995, approximately 30 agree-
ments were signed between the two states, all an indi-
cation of growing relations.145 
In early 2000, a serious diplomatic crisis between 
Macedonia and Turkey broke out due to Macedonia’s 
preparedness to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. 
Relations between Greece and Macedonia began to 
soften after Macedonia changed its flag.146 Ankara 
asked Macedonia to suspend the recognition until a 
final solution for Cyprus had been reached. Fazıl 
Keşmir, Turkey’s ambassador to Skopje, had stated on 
a Macedonian TV channel that diplomatic relations 
would be cut off and the embassy would be closed if 
Macedonia recognized the Republic of Cyprus.147 The 
Macedonian media strongly warned the government 
that relations with Turkey would deteriorate. As one 
commenter in the Macedonian paper Dnevnik wrote: 
“The closest friend” would be lost if Macedonia recog-
nized Cyprus.148 In March 2000, the members of par-
liament in the Interparliamentary Friendship Groups 
initiated “letter diplomacy,” by way of which it was 
recalled that Turkey was the first state to open an 
embassy in Macedonia. Diplomatic relations between 
the two states were established in 2000. 
Unlike the 1990s, when Macedonia managed to 
avoid an armed conflict, unlike Bosnia, the year 2001 
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was a time of insurgency. Ethnic Albanian rebels 
calling themselves the National Liberation Army 
launched attacks on Macedonian security forces, 
which in turn started a counter-insurgency campaign. 
With US and European diplomatic intervention, the 
parties signed a framework agreement on August 13 
amidst the deadliest violence to date. Turkey played 
an important role by providing military aid to Mac-
edonia. Macedonian officials said they did not want 
military support from Turkey, yet added that they 
would like Turkey to assume a more effective role 
in NATO.149 Erdoğan was quoted to have said that 
Albanian people have the right to self-determination 
and the creation of a Great Albanian State,150 that the 
Kosovo Liberation Army is not a revolutionary terrorist 
organization but expresses the will of the Albanians 
to defend their lands; and that Turkish troops are on 
standby to help liberate occupied Albanian lands. In 
1912, Albania became the last Balkan country to gain 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. But Alba-
nians in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece 
were left outside the new state, giving rise to the 
dream of a united Albanian nation.151 After Kosovo 
gained independence in 2008, the movement “Vetë-
vendosja” (“Self-determination”) gained significant 
influence. During Ottoman rule, many Albanians were 
left living outside the new Albanian state, most within 
the borders of what would later become Yugoslavia – 
Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia, and Montenegro 
– and for some, that dream of living within the Alba-
nian border once again causes frictions among the 
different ethnic groups in the area, particularly in 
Macedonia and southern Serbia.152 
In 2006, Turkey committed its continued support 
to Macedonia’s NATO membership bid. However, ten-
sions erupted again in 2007 when Skopje changed 
the name of its international airport to Alexander the 
Great, prompting Athens to oppose Macedonia’s NATO 
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bid. NATO’s invitation to Macedonia was blocked by 
Greece at the 2008 Bucharest Summit.153 
In March 2010, Davutoğlu, the Turkish foreign 
minister, met his Macedonian counterpart, Antonio 
Milososki, in Skopje and fully expressed his nations 
support in one sentence: “The citizens of the Republic 
of Macedonia, wherever they are in the world can, if 
they need help, call the embassies of Turkey. They will 
get help, as they are Turkish citizens.” Davutoğlu did 
not fail to convey a message of support on similar 
occasions: “Turkey gives great attention to the politi-
cal stability and prosperity of Macedonia because it is 
the heart of the Balkans. That is why Ankara was one 
of the first countries that recognized Macedonia under 
its constitutional name. I believe that the path of 
Macedonia towards the EU should be opened and the 
Turkish support for NATO membership for Macedonia 
will continue.”154 During the past two decades, Turkey 
has been one of the most fervent supporters of Mac-
edonia’s accession to NATO.155 Over the years, Turkey 
has donated military equipment and provided Macedo-
nia with numerous trainings and courses for officers 
and non-commissioned officers. On December 24, 
2010, the ministers of defense of Turkey and Macedo-
nia signed an agreement on military-financial co-
operation. Reportedly, more Macedonian generals 
from the Macedonian Army speak Turkish than Eng-
lish. Turkey’s development aid is focused on repairing 
and refurbishing schools as well as on agricultural 
development projects (TIKA). In Macedonia there are 
the Yahya Kemal primary and secondary schools and 
colleges, and the International Balkan University. Tur-
key’s state-owned Anadolu Agency opened a bilingual 
Macedonian and Albanian desk in Skopje, expanding 
its operations further into the Balkan region. The close 
relationship between the two countries is reflected in 
their economic and trade relations. In 2008, the Turk-
ish company TAV won the 20-year contract to operate 
Macedonia’s two airports, in Skopje and Ohrid, and to 
build another in the town of Štip in the next 10 years. 
Turkey’s direct investment in Macedonia is led by 
the construction and banking sectors and the airport 
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operations. From 2010 to 2014 the FYROM received 
€74.1 million156 worth of FDI from Turkey.157 This, 
however, represents only 5.5 percent of the FYROM’s 
FDI total for the period.158 
According to statistical data for 2014, the most im-
portant countries of origin and the largest annual FDI 
inflows into the FYROM originated from Switzerland, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the United Kingdom, 
Hungary, Germany, and only then Turkey.159 
The data on foreign trade does not differ much 
from the data patterns of other countries in the 
region. The main trade partners and destinations for 
FYROM exports in 2014 were: Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, 
Serbia, Greece, Belgium, Croatia, and other countries.160 
Germany is the number one export destination, with 
more than €1.6 billion161 or 41.43 percent of total 
exports.162 In 2014, the FYROM was mostly importing 
from Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Serbia, Italy, 
China, Bulgaria, and Turkey.163 Turkey imported 
€308.1 million164 – or 5.14 percent – of goods in the 
FYROM.165 The numbers show that Turkey’s foreign 
policy as a negotiating tool remained limited in the 
spheres of political and cultural cooperation. The self-
proclaimed attorney of Macedonia, as the Greek press 
called Turkey, gained substantial credit in Macedonia 
– among political leaders as well as the population – 
for its early and constant support of its independence 
and the recognition of the country under its constitu-
tional name. Contrary to mainstream thought, Turks 
are often more accepted among Macedonians than 
Albanians, who recall the Ottoman times when their 
identities were eliminated and they were unimportant 
citizens. Turkey’s desire to improve relations in the 
country may well be paused if the lack of trust among 
ethnic groups toward Turkey carries on. In the long 
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run, Ankara’s plan is to be seen not only as a mediator 
but preferably as an agenda-setter. In order to improve 
its chances, it must legitimate its goals across ethnic 
groups; but given its credentials so far, that is not as 
realistic. 
 
 
 SWP Berlin 
Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans 
December 2016 
 
 
 
27 
Can Old Animosities Die? 
Serbia-Turkey Relations                                  
 
The greatest strategic shift in Turkey’s policy in the 
Balkans is evident in its relations with Serbia. The 
ups and downs in this long relationship throughout 
history have evolved from open animosity to “strategic 
partnership.” Serbia, like many other areas in the 
region, was part of the Ottoman Empire, which has 
left traces both culturally and in memory. Unlike with 
the majority of the Muslim kin communities in Bos-
nia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania, Serbs recall this 
era as a period of slavery under the Turks. It is a period 
remembered as a time of huge tax burdens and un-
punished crimes.166 
Terms such as “Turkish oppression,” “Turkish ser-
vitude,” and the “Turkish yoke” have become standard 
in relations between Turkey and Serbia. At the same 
time, Turkey’s reflections on the same period look 
rather different. In the words of former Prime Minister 
Davutoğlu: “If there was no Ottoman state, Sokullu 
Mehmed Pasha – Ottoman Grand Vezir who was taken 
from one Serbian family – would be a poor Serbian 
man who lived just to have a small farm.”167 In today’s 
Serbia, attitudes have changed to some extent, and the 
relations between Serbia and Turkey are purely prag-
matically driven. 
As an ally of Bosnian Muslims during the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and having gained 
a privileged position among Muslim communities, 
Ankara’s relations with Serbia were destined to be 
problematic. Even though Turkey has tried to avoid 
creating sharp divisions in its relations with Serbia, 
in 1992, together with the United States, it pushed for 
the adoption of a resolution that clearly defined Serbs 
as aggressors and BiH Muslims as the victims.168 The 
official Serbian and Turkish positions appeared un-
bridgeable, until 2000. After the downfall of the Slobo-
dan Milošević regime – and with joining the EU being 
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at the top of the agenda for the entire Balkans – Tur-
key embarked on a new approach. Ankara’s New 
Balkan initiative, which consisted of the establish-
ment of a trilateral mechanism among Serbia, BiH, 
and Turkey, set the grounds for closer cooperation, 
stressing the fact that durable peace and stability in 
the region are not possible without Serbia. 
Turkey’s main endeavor was to assume the role of 
a regional mediator and emphasize regional coopera-
tion, which – in the case of the Western Balkans – was 
of utmost importance. 
The regional cooperation that was already in place 
was originally conceived by Germany, having estab-
lished the Stability Pact for South and Eastern Europe. 
The Stability Pact had limited success, as pointed 
out in the report by the European Stability Initiative, 
because there was a mismatch between the expecta-
tions and resources given to the pact initially.169 Later 
on, in 2008, it was replaced with the Regional Co-
operation Council (RCC), as regional cooperation has 
been a policy priority for the EU, and also a specific 
requirement under the stabilization and association 
agreements. Although it was structurally solid and 
relatively well-resourced, the RCC’s track record was 
not the most impressive. Bilateral issues kept on re-
surfacing in the region, and the overall lack of politi-
cal collaboration was not being tackled. Free from 
bureaucratic and often inadequate mechanisms, 
and assuming its new role in the region, Ankara ap-
proached the regional cooperation project outside of 
the usual framework, initiating bilateral, trilateral, 
and multilateral peace initiatives. The trilateral meet-
ings with Serbia were presented as being most vital, 
since most of the talks had been directed toward eco-
nomic relations and the improvement of cooperation 
in this field.170 
Effects of the Turkey-initiated dialogue mechanism 
became apparent after the appointment of a Bosnian 
ambassador to Belgrade in 2010. This transpired after 
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heated political disputes, which were due to the 1990s 
war and the almost three years during which BiH had 
had no diplomatic representative in its neighboring 
country. An apology given later by former Serbian 
President Tadić in the Serbian parliament with regard 
to Srebrenica has been seen as a direct consequence 
of the trilateral meetings. Ultimately, the absolute 
triumph for Turkey was to bring together Serbian 
President Tadić and BiH President Silajdžić for the first 
time. Tadić, who led progressive forces in Serbia, had 
an overwhelming task to prove that the new Serbia 
could lend a hand to the Muslims in the region. It had 
to show to the EU and the West that it had a vested 
interest in showing more concretely regional coopera-
tion and reconciliation with its neighbors. At the same 
time, long-serving politician from Bosnia, Silajdžić, 
known for his hard stances against Serbia and Repub-
lika Srpska in BiH, risked becoming completely 
isolated from the high-level discussions of the inter-
national community, and trilateral discussions pro-
vided the needed space to regain some influence. 
Previously, Silajdžić had qualified Serbia as being a 
country that damages regional relations. Only 10 
days after that statement, he shook hands with Tadić, 
sending a message of friendship. Turkey’s interest in 
such an initiative was to demonstrate its full power 
as an actor that could bring the region together, and 
to demonstrate its diplomatic supremacy over the 
West by bringing former warring parties – Muslims 
and Serbs – to the same table. No less important: For 
Turkey this was a clear message that it could deliver 
results on its own. 
A period of turbulence for the two countries came 
right after the independence of Kosovo in 2008. Tur-
key was second to recognize it, and it jeopardized its 
relations with Serbia, which considers Kosovo as part 
of its own territory. Careless rhetoric of former Prime 
Minister Erdoğan in October 2013 led to angry reac-
tions that required Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to visit 
Belgrade to soften the situation. In December 2015 
Serbia and Turkey signed a strategic partnership to 
pursue advanced trade via the establishment of insti-
tutional mechanisms and biannual cabinet meetings. 
This moment marked a peak in Turkey-Serbia rela-
tions. Putting aside disagreements and working on 
constructive new approaches promoted Turkey’s role 
in a new fashion, one that went beyond the usual kin 
community narrative. However, Turkey’s successes as 
mediator are only helpful to the EU as long as the 
countries in question are on an EU path.171 
In spite of partially successful results with news 
initiatives, Ankara has managed to strike a balance 
between the natural anchoring of its foreign policy 
with Muslim populations that look toward Turkey for 
leadership, and a policy of engaging all sides diplo-
matically.172 The common message coming from Tur-
key is that Serbia is a key partner in creating a new 
era of relations in the Balkans. Turkey and Serbia have 
shown an enviable dose of political pragmatism, as 
they are aware of the limitations and risks. This has 
led to a variety of possibilities for cooperation – with 
investments foremost. 
Outside the political spectrum, increasing economic 
relations and trade volume led to more interaction. 
The Turkish practice of taking businesspeople on for-
eign trips with key decision-makers – a practice used 
everywhere in the region – was heavily used in Serbia, 
too. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić has 
stated that Serbia will pay “special” attention to Turk-
ish investors. In October 2014, the Turkish textile com-
pany Jeanci signed an agreement with the Serbian gov-
ernment to open a new textile factory that will employ 
more than 600 people. Turkish car parts manufacturer 
Teklas opened a new plant in the southern Serbian 
town of Vladičin Han as part of the plan to invest 
€11.35 million ($12.9 million) in the country. The 
state-owned Turkish bank Halkbank acquired 76 per-
cent of Serbia’s Čačanska Bank in March 2015, and 
Halkbank opened its first branch in Belgrade last 
October. In December 2015, Davutoğlu paid a visit to 
Serbia, stressing the growing multidimensionality 
of the countries’ bilateral ties, despite the remaining 
differences over the Kosovo issue and differing views 
on the recent Turkish-Russian crisis.173 
Since 2011 Turkey has also developed a new scholar-
ship program for students from Serbia. There were 
45,000 applications from 160 countries for scholar-
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ships that the Turkish state offered in 2012: 1,600 of 
which were from the Balkan countries.174 
Serbia is near the center of every major political 
discussion regarding developments in the Western 
Balkans. Serbia’s favorable geographical position and 
its overarching, historically dominant political influ-
ence on other countries in the region make it stra-
tegically indispensable for Turkey. On the other hand, 
Serbia’s despair over the lack of economic investment 
and its aim to become more economically confident 
provide a framework for future relations based on 
convenience, at least until the conditions for those 
developments materialize. However, the durability 
of this alliance will not last unless there is long-term 
mutual interest. 
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30 
Turkey’s Activism as Seen from the Balkans 
 
Major drivers of Turkey’s new foreign policy have been 
centered on the nation’s history, culture, and geo-
political position. Politically, Turkey puts the Balkans 
at the center of five intersecting regions, including the 
Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the East-
ern Mediterranean. Providing more access to the 
region is seen as a matter of domestic national prior-
ity, as Turkey is considered by many Turks to be a par-
tially Balkan country – not solely by virtue of location, 
but also for its well-preserved culture, cuisine, and cus-
toms in terms of food and social life. During a cam-
paign speech in 2013, President Erdoğan sparked a 
diplomatic row, stating that parts of the Balkans 
belong to Turkey. This statement created lots of ten-
sion in the countries, in which territorial disputes 
persist to this day.175 The neo-Ottoman nostalgia that 
has been featured in Turkish public discourse has, 
over time, become a prevalent narrative in Turkish 
society within political and intellectual forums. The 
notion that Turkey should care for its former Ottoman 
citizens – many of whom come from the Balkans – is 
virtually uncontested. Forging close ties based on Otto-
man nostalgia has become a matter of national unity, 
and Turkey’s presence in the Balkans has been solidi-
fied over time and across the political spectrum. More-
over, immigration, which is responsible for large parts 
of the population on both sides, has cultivated con-
nections for centuries. For Turkey, the Balkans is the 
prime foreign policy venue and an indispensable site 
for power parades. Although it is false to believe this 
will ever be a unified territory again, much of the 
romanticism of the Balkans has been preserved. 
A clear separation of sentiments toward Turkey is 
much more visible in the Western Balkans. Whereas 
the political elites in the Western Balkans unanimous-
ly display almost divine devotion to the Turkish politi-
cal establishment and nurture good relations, citizens 
with more liberal views dread the possibility of Turkey 
becoming more influential in the region, especially in 
light of the more assertive autocratic nature of Presi-
dent Erdoğan’s regime. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
 
175  Zorana Brozović, Territorial and Border Demarcation Disputes 
in the Western Balkans, Policy Paper 3 (Belgrade: Belgrade 
Centre for Security Policy, December 2011). 
popularity of Turkey – driven through political 
speeches and campaigns – has become a tenet of Bos-
niak politics, and stories of the good life under the 
Turks are overwhelmingly a part of the state politics. 
An urban anecdote of the former president of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, talks about leaving 
Bosnia on a death bed to President Erdoğan as an 
emanet – an inheritance to be taken care of.176 It has 
become a mainstream anecdote that Bosniak political 
elites have empowered Turkey and given them un-
precedented opportunities for realizing their foreign 
policy ambitions. Ever since, this has been used by 
political elites, the media, and some scholars as wide-
spread folklore for more political gains. The demand 
for a greater Turkish presence – not only economically 
but also in everyday life – by the establishments in 
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina similarly shapes the 
perception that Turkey offers an alternative for the 
Balkans, one that is different from the European Union. 
In his speech in Sarajevo in October 2009, Davutoğlu 
proposed that the Balkan countries could escape the 
destiny of being on the periphery or the victim of geo-
strategic competition of great powers by reestablish-
ing the successes from the Ottoman period. In that 
sense, the Empire’s model is seen as a positive example 
and the solution to ethnic and religious conflicts. “As 
the Republic of Turkey, we would like to construct a 
new Balkan region based on political dialogue, eco-
nomic interdependence, cooperation and integration, 
as well as cultural harmony and tolerance. These were 
the Ottoman Balkans, and hopefully we will reestab-
lish the spirit of these Balkans.”177 Responding in 
similar fashion at the conference in Istanbul, in 2011, 
then President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bakir Izet-
begović openly predicted Turkey’s future as being at 
the center of attraction and magnetism – of the Orient, 
 
176  Definition: Person or thing entrusted to another’s safe-
keeping, a trust; checkroom for baggage; entrusted to (some-
one’s safekeeping); source: “Emanet (Ottoman government)”, 
Encylopaedia Britannica (online), https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/emanet. 
177  “Address of H. E. Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, at the conference: The Otto-
man Legacy and the Balkans’ Muslim community today” 
(Sarajevo, 16–18 October 2009). 
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not Europe. This complementarity of outlooks and 
symbolism in public spaces – with Balkan leaders 
often referring to Turkey in intimate, personal, and 
even family-oriented terms – reveals a profound con-
trast in the power dynamics between Turkey and the 
Western Balkans: one a former colonist and the other 
a former victim. Centuries later, this relation has 
changed; countries have gained independence, but the 
political language often echoes the past. In the after-
math of the military coup in July 2016, leaders from 
the Balkans greeted President Erdoğan’s restoration 
of control in Turkey. “Happy for the brotherly Turkish 
people and our valuable friend, President Erdoğan, 
for going out – with full success – from a very difficult 
night,” Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama wrote on 
twitter.178 President Izetbegović went one step further, 
cementing bonds between the two countries: “My 
message to my brother Erdoğan is that he has strong 
support here, amongst us in Bosnia.”179 An unreserved 
political friendship spreading across some parts of the 
region equals the aloof reception of Turkey in others. 
Even among Muslims in the Balkans, Kosovo, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, there is no 
unified approach toward Turkey, and even more so to 
its policies and open interference in the region. Con-
cessions given to Turkey in exchange for the desper-
ately needed economic projects are not welcomed by 
all. In 2015, Turkey demanded closure of Hizmet schools 
in Albania, which sparked a fierce reaction from the 
Albanian chief of the socialist ruling party in Albania: 
“The Turkish president visited us and wanted us to 
close schools. How did he say that? As a brother? As 
a friend? No. He said that as he is our father. If we 
Albanians have our father, it should be Skender-beg, 
Ismail Kemal. We [Albanians], have no father outside 
of Albania. This request put before us is unacceptable, 
we [Albanians], are not a Turkish colony.”180 During 
Ottoman times, the Balkan states enjoyed the status 
of vassal states paying tribute to the colonists. This 
vassal-based181 relationship is still problematic for 
 
178  “Balkan Leaders Praise Erdogan for Defeating Coup”, 
Balkan Insight, 16 July 2016, https://goo.gl/AWAKdd (accessed 
22 September 2016). 
179  Ibid. 
180  “Albanski parlament Erdoanu: ‘Mi nismo turska kolonija 
i nemamo oca izvan zemlje!’” [Albanian Parliament to Erdo-
ğan: “We are not a Turkish colony and we have no father out-
side Albania”], Dnevni Avaz newspapers, 19 May 2015, https:// 
goo.gl/ND7ONF (accessed 14 August 2016). 
181  Definition of “vassal”: “(in the feudal system) a person 
granted the use of land, in return for rendering homage, 
fealty, and usually military service or its equivalent to a lord 
many Muslims in the region, and the scholarly elite 
throughout the region reject this notion strongly. 
Although a significant number of ethnic Turks living 
in the Balkans undeniably feel a strong religious and 
cultural affinity with Turkey, the citizens of the West-
ern Balkan region are more likely to see themselves 
as part of the larger European Union. A large majority 
(39 percent) still consider membership within the 
European Union to be a good thing and consider EU 
membership as the paramount goal of their domestic 
transformation. 
 
 
 
or other superior; feudal tenant”; source: http://www. 
dictionary.com/browse/vassal (accessed 3 December 2015). 
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Western Balkans – EU’s Forgotten Post? 
 
The promise from the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans 
summit, which resulted in the Thessaloniki Declara-
tion affirming explicitly that “the future of the Bal-
kans is within the European Union,” is long overdue. 
The European Union conditionality toolbox that 
worked well in previous enlargements has lost its 
power. With the exception of Croatia, all of the coun-
tries that began the process of joining in 2013 – after 
10 years of negotiations – are far from full EU mem-
bership. A series of demands from the European side 
toward the Western Balkan countries were often 
lacking in consistency. The credibility of the EU was 
further eroded by arbitrarily applying conditions to 
the Western Balkans. Croatia, for example, signed its 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) as early 
as 2001 and became a candidate for EU membership 
in June 2004. At that time, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave its opinion 
that Zagreb’s cooperation was a positive element, 
despite the fact that indicted Croatian General, Ante 
Gotovina, had not been handed over. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the SAA negotiating process largely 
depended on compliance with the police reform con-
ditions set by the Office of the High Representative – 
conditions that had never existed for any other coun-
try. No country had ever been asked to implement 
such reforms, neither as a prelude to an association 
agreement nor for EU membership. 
The transformation process that was originally 
designed to serve as an impetus that leads to full 
political and economic stability did not yield results. 
The change of leadership in the European Commission 
in 2014; the “five year freeze”182 on enlargement; the 
 
182  Jean-Claude Juncker, Candidate for President of the Euro-
pean Commission, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for 
Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Opening 
Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session”, 
Strasbourg, 15 July 2014 (p. 11): “When it comes to enlarge-
ment, […] this has been an historic success […]. However, the 
Union and our citizens now need to digest the addition of 13 
Member States in the past ten years. The EU needs to take a 
break from enlargement so that we can consolidate what 
has been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presi-
dency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, 
and notably the Western Balkans will need to keep a Europe-
an perspective, but no further enlargement will take place 
rise of “illiberalism” in the EU; and the EU’s inability 
to counterbalance negative views on enlargement in 
the member states resulted in an almost complete 
power vacuum in the Western Balkan countries. To 
counter negative trends and launch more durable 
prospects for the region, the German government 
launched the “Berlin Process” in 2014 following a 
series of high-level visits to the region,183 restating the 
importance of supporting the region’s bid for mem-
bership in the EU. Forgotten commitments have been 
reinvigorated by a new roadmap, whose main focus is 
on the economy, connectivity, civil society, and youth. 
A target date for the accession of Serbia is 2022–2025, 
provided that other bilateral issues do not create more 
stumbling stones. Lasting stability and economic devel-
opment serve as the major rationale for providing sup-
port, but a weak state of democracy in the region plays 
a significant role, too. 
 
 
 
over the next five years.” https://goo.gl/jnnmRf (accessed 
3 December 2016). 
183  The Berlin Process, a five-year process launched by Ger-
many in order to underline the commitment to EU-enlarge-
ment towards the Western Balkans region. The focus of the 
initiative is on those countries of the Western Balkans that 
are not yet EU members: Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. 
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Outlook 
 
The EU and Turkey have different approaches to the 
Western Balkans. To a great extent, this is a matter of 
different priorities – and even a different geographical 
neighborhood – but also a matter of very different 
capabilities at their disposal. For the European Union, 
the focus is largely on the security of the Western Bal-
kans, which, if challenged, may have unwanted con-
sequences, as seen in the 1990s. For Turkey, it is more 
about projecting its own political power due to its con-
siderable clout in the region, particularly with respect 
to Muslims. However, different views do not have to be 
barriers, but should rather be translated into a variety 
of possibilities for collaboration. 
The strong EU anchor that is missing in the West-
ern Balkans and the uncertain future of Turkey’s for-
eign policy direction will progressively deepen the 
necessity to synchronize approaches in the Western 
Balkans. The region’s economic prospects are rather 
bleak due to high unemployment and social discon-
tent. Although the EU holds instruments to bring the 
Western Balkans region closer to the EU and ultimately 
improve the situation on the ground, a number of 
pressing issues – such as the prevailing financial crisis 
in the EU, the refugee inflow, terrorism, the Middle 
East crisis, and, finally, Brexit184 – have shifted the 
Union’s priorities from the Western Balkans. On the 
other hand, Turkey’s current domestic political 
dynamics will complicate relations with the region 
later. If Turkey returns to economic growth, plural-
ism, democracy, and closer ties with the EU, its in-
fluence in the region can broaden. If Turkey verges 
toward more authoritarian rule, Islamism, and anti-
Western feelings, it will improve its standing with 
politicians from the region, who regard the present 
form of rule in Turkey to be adequate. 
Given the continued considerable attractiveness of 
the European Union in the Western Balkans, the EU 
must reinforce its role on a very practical level, show 
more flexibility in foreign policy mechanisms, and 
improve economic governance beyond the Berlin Pro-
cess agenda. Advancing the existing structures, the 
challenge for the EU is in managing previous expec-
 
184  Brexit was the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union. 
tations, namely EU membership. Equally important is 
to highlight the necessity for the EU to look for corre-
spondingly sophisticated policy tools to be introduced 
in the region that will deepen the European context 
and reaffirm a European future for the citizens of the 
region. In a time when people in the Western Balkans 
feel profoundly disconnected from their political 
leaders, this might be the key push factor. 
In order to understand why Turkish influence has 
grown in the Western Balkans, the EU must make an 
effort and pursue further knowledge about Turkey’s 
“soft policies” and its competitive powers in the region. 
Knowing the conditionality limitations in the Balkans, 
applying only EU solutions to specific national issues 
does not always bear results. Instead of looking at Tur-
key as a competitor, the EU should include Turkey 
as soon as possible into multilateral activities in the 
Western Balkans (e.g., through the Berlin Process). 
An alienated and authoritarian Turkey could bring in-
creasing levels of uncertainties to the region. Through-
out the 1990s, Turkey proved to be a trustworthy part-
ner in multilateral activities. Its participation in 
military and civilian missions contributed to fostering 
stability in the region. In the last decade, Turkey has 
shown a noteworthy level of political pragmatism, its 
interest in the region is evident, and it may well be a 
valuable partner in the process. If the EU and Turkey 
share some interests in the Western Balkans, there 
should be a way to accommodate different approach-
es. The point would be to seek an objective dialogue 
and initiate cooperation in fields where shared inter-
ests exist. 
Turkey’s own lack of progress on its path toward EU 
membership is often associated with the Western Bal-
kans, making the Western Balkans an example of the 
failed policies of the EU. Europe’s comparative advan-
tage lies within its diversified approach and its unique 
ability to build networks within societies – for the 
region as a whole. More committed EU assistance can 
reassure the public in the Western Balkans and com-
pensate for shortcomings while long-term strategic 
goals are pushed. 
Finally, the countries of the region should formu-
late their own foreign policy priorities and relations – 
both with Turkey and the EU – which would be based 
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on pragmatic interests as well as the development of 
economic and political relations. A strong liberal push 
from within must take place to strengthen democratic 
institutions that can ensure the rule of law and deep 
reforms. In a best-case scenario, no country in the 
Western Balkans will join the EU before 2020, and 
much of the progress to be made will take place in 
the Western Balkans itself. 
Abbreviations 
AKP Justice and Development Party /  
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
BİGMEV Development center of cultural, economic and 
scientific relations between countries associated with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement 
CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) 
EU European Union (since 1993) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
IFOR Implementation Force 
MAP Membership Action Plan 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OHR Office of the High Representative 
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
PIC Peace Implementation Council 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
RCC Regional Cooperation Council 
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
SEEBRIG South-Eastern Europe Brigade 
SFOR Stabilization Force 
TIKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
UN United Nations 
